Game and Information Theory Analysis of Electronic Countermeasures in Pursuit-Evasion Games

• Published in: IEEE transactions on systems, man and cybernetics. Part A, Systems and humans man and cybernetics. Part A, Systems and humans, 2008-11, Vol.38 (6), p.1281-1294
• Main Authors: Brooks, R.R., Jing-En Pang, Griffin, C.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Acceleration; Automobiles; Electrochemical machining; Electronic countermeasure (ECM); Electronic countermeasures; Game theory; Games; Information analysis; Information theory; Intelligent vehicles; Laboratories; pursuit evasion; Studies; Turning
• ISSN: 1083-4427; 2168-2216; 1558-2426; 2168-2232
• DOI: 10.1109/TSMCA.2008.2003970

Two-player pursuit-evasion games in the literature typically either assume both players have perfect knowledge of the opponent's positions or use primitive sensing models. This unrealistically skews the problem in favor of the pursuer who needs only maintain a faster velocity at all turning radii. In real life, an evader usually escapes when the pursuer no longer knows the evader's position. In our previous work, we modeled pursuit evasion without perfect information as a two-player bimatrix game by using a realistic sensor model and information theory to compute game-theoretic payoff matrices. That game has a saddle point when the evader uses strategies that exploit sensor limitations, whereas the pursuer relies on strategies that ignore the sensing limitations. In this paper, we consider, for the first time, the effect of many types of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on pursuit-evasion games. The evader's decision to initiate its ECM is modeled as a function of the distance between the players. Simulations show how to find optimal strategies for ECM use when initial conditions are known. We also discuss the effectiveness of different ECM technologies in pursuit-evasion games.