Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model

This paper develops an optimal energy efficiency subsidy model and analyze it. Consumer choice failure is necessary for subsidies to be warranted when electricity prices are too high. To deal with consumer choices failure, it portrays welfare effects of subsidizing efficiency by assigning the full w...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Niu, Dongxiao, Cao, Siying
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Costs
Energy consumption
Energy efficiency
Failure analysis
Investments
Large-scale systems
Power generation
Power industry
Pricing
Regulators
Online Access:Request full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites
container_end_page 4
container_issue
container_start_page 1
container_title
container_volume
creator Niu, Dongxiao
Cao, Siying
description This paper develops an optimal energy efficiency subsidy model and analyze it. Consumer choice failure is necessary for subsidies to be warranted when electricity prices are too high. To deal with consumer choices failure, it portrays welfare effects of subsidizing efficiency by assigning the full welfare benefits of those investments through expansion of the set of individuals. Such an ascription is inconsistent with basing welfare on revealed preference, but the inconsistency is an inevitable consequence of assuming that consumers fail to act in their self-interest by under-investing in efficiency. Analyzing these models reveals that if the gain in surplus from those overcoming consumer choice failure is simply reduced spending on energy, and if no consumers make such investments on their own, then capping the revenues of a generator or utility selling electricity will induce it to substitute energy efficiency for generation when doing so is less costly.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301415
format conference_proceeding
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>ieee_6IE</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_5301415</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>5301415</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>5301415</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i90t-ccc01b2d534aeb151189d9bbb12edefdc580583cd15645f24d6f81d62fba00a33</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNo1j09Lw0AUxFekoK35AnrJzVPie7tvt7tHCVELLT2k97J_ZSXWktRDvr0V61yGgR_DDGP3CDUimKdVs-m6mgOYWgpAQnnFCrPUSJyIlDB4zeb_QdOMzX9ZAyQ03LBiHD_gLJJ8qfgte9weT_nT9mV7iMP7VLYpZZ_jwU9l9-3GHKZy8xVif8dmyfZjLC6-YLuXdte8Vevt66p5XlfZwKny3gM6HqQgGx1KRG2Ccc4hjyGm4KUGqYUPKBXJxCmopDEonpwFsEIs2MNfbY4x7o_Dedow7S8_xQ_Pe0N5</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype></control><display><type>conference_proceeding</type><title>Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model</title><source>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</source><creator>Niu, Dongxiao ; Cao, Siying</creator><creatorcontrib>Niu, Dongxiao ; Cao, Siying</creatorcontrib><description>This paper develops an optimal energy efficiency subsidy model and analyze it. Consumer choice failure is necessary for subsidies to be warranted when electricity prices are too high. To deal with consumer choices failure, it portrays welfare effects of subsidizing efficiency by assigning the full welfare benefits of those investments through expansion of the set of individuals. Such an ascription is inconsistent with basing welfare on revealed preference, but the inconsistency is an inevitable consequence of assuming that consumers fail to act in their self-interest by under-investing in efficiency. Analyzing these models reveals that if the gain in surplus from those overcoming consumer choice failure is simply reduced spending on energy, and if no consumers make such investments on their own, then capping the revenues of a generator or utility selling electricity will induce it to substitute energy efficiency for generation when doing so is less costly.</description><identifier>ISBN: 1424446384</identifier><identifier>ISBN: 9781424446384</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9781424446391</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 1424446392</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301415</identifier><identifier>LCCN: 2009904380</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Costs ; Energy consumption ; Energy efficiency ; Failure analysis ; Investments ; Large-scale systems ; Power generation ; Power industry ; Pricing ; Regulators</subject><ispartof>2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science, 2009, p.1-4</ispartof><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5301415$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,776,780,785,786,2052,27901,54894</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5301415$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Niu, Dongxiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cao, Siying</creatorcontrib><title>Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model</title><title>2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science</title><addtitle>ICMSS</addtitle><description>This paper develops an optimal energy efficiency subsidy model and analyze it. Consumer choice failure is necessary for subsidies to be warranted when electricity prices are too high. To deal with consumer choices failure, it portrays welfare effects of subsidizing efficiency by assigning the full welfare benefits of those investments through expansion of the set of individuals. Such an ascription is inconsistent with basing welfare on revealed preference, but the inconsistency is an inevitable consequence of assuming that consumers fail to act in their self-interest by under-investing in efficiency. Analyzing these models reveals that if the gain in surplus from those overcoming consumer choice failure is simply reduced spending on energy, and if no consumers make such investments on their own, then capping the revenues of a generator or utility selling electricity will induce it to substitute energy efficiency for generation when doing so is less costly.</description><subject>Costs</subject><subject>Energy consumption</subject><subject>Energy efficiency</subject><subject>Failure analysis</subject><subject>Investments</subject><subject>Large-scale systems</subject><subject>Power generation</subject><subject>Power industry</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Regulators</subject><isbn>1424446384</isbn><isbn>9781424446384</isbn><isbn>9781424446391</isbn><isbn>1424446392</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2009</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><recordid>eNo1j09Lw0AUxFekoK35AnrJzVPie7tvt7tHCVELLT2k97J_ZSXWktRDvr0V61yGgR_DDGP3CDUimKdVs-m6mgOYWgpAQnnFCrPUSJyIlDB4zeb_QdOMzX9ZAyQ03LBiHD_gLJJ8qfgte9weT_nT9mV7iMP7VLYpZZ_jwU9l9-3GHKZy8xVif8dmyfZjLC6-YLuXdte8Vevt66p5XlfZwKny3gM6HqQgGx1KRG2Ccc4hjyGm4KUGqYUPKBXJxCmopDEonpwFsEIs2MNfbY4x7o_Dedow7S8_xQ_Pe0N5</recordid><startdate>200909</startdate><enddate>200909</enddate><creator>Niu, Dongxiao</creator><creator>Cao, Siying</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200909</creationdate><title>Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model</title><author>Niu, Dongxiao ; Cao, Siying</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i90t-ccc01b2d534aeb151189d9bbb12edefdc580583cd15645f24d6f81d62fba00a33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2009</creationdate><topic>Costs</topic><topic>Energy consumption</topic><topic>Energy efficiency</topic><topic>Failure analysis</topic><topic>Investments</topic><topic>Large-scale systems</topic><topic>Power generation</topic><topic>Power industry</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Regulators</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Niu, Dongxiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cao, Siying</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Niu, Dongxiao</au><au>Cao, Siying</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model</atitle><btitle>2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science</btitle><stitle>ICMSS</stitle><date>2009-09</date><risdate>2009</risdate><spage>1</spage><epage>4</epage><pages>1-4</pages><isbn>1424446384</isbn><isbn>9781424446384</isbn><eisbn>9781424446391</eisbn><eisbn>1424446392</eisbn><abstract>This paper develops an optimal energy efficiency subsidy model and analyze it. Consumer choice failure is necessary for subsidies to be warranted when electricity prices are too high. To deal with consumer choices failure, it portrays welfare effects of subsidizing efficiency by assigning the full welfare benefits of those investments through expansion of the set of individuals. Such an ascription is inconsistent with basing welfare on revealed preference, but the inconsistency is an inevitable consequence of assuming that consumers fail to act in their self-interest by under-investing in efficiency. Analyzing these models reveals that if the gain in surplus from those overcoming consumer choice failure is simply reduced spending on energy, and if no consumers make such investments on their own, then capping the revenues of a generator or utility selling electricity will induce it to substitute energy efficiency for generation when doing so is less costly.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301415</doi><tpages>4</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier ISBN: 1424446384
ispartof 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science, 2009, p.1-4
issn
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_5301415
source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings
subjects Costs
Energy consumption
Energy efficiency
Failure analysis
Investments
Large-scale systems
Power generation
Power industry
Pricing
Regulators
title Optimal Energy Efficiency Subsidy Model
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-24T17%3A34%3A34IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee_6IE&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.atitle=Optimal%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Subsidy%20Model&rft.btitle=2009%20International%20Conference%20on%20Management%20and%20Service%20Science&rft.au=Niu,%20Dongxiao&rft.date=2009-09&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=4&rft.pages=1-4&rft.isbn=1424446384&rft.isbn_list=9781424446384&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301415&rft.eisbn=9781424446391&rft.eisbn_list=1424446392&rft_dat=%3Cieee_6IE%3E5301415%3C/ieee_6IE%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i90t-ccc01b2d534aeb151189d9bbb12edefdc580583cd15645f24d6f81d62fba00a33%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=5301415&rfr_iscdi=true