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Secure Bindings of SAML Assertions to TLS Sessions
In recent research work, two approaches to protect SAML based Federated Identity Management (FIM) against man-in-the-middle attacks have been proposed. One approach is to bind the SAML assertion and the SAML artifact to the public key contained in a TLS client certificate. Another approach is to str...
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| container_end_page | 69 |
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| creator | Kohlar, F. Schwenk, J. Jensen, M. Gajek, S. |
| description | In recent research work, two approaches to protect SAML based Federated Identity Management (FIM) against man-in-the-middle attacks have been proposed. One approach is to bind the SAML assertion and the SAML artifact to the public key contained in a TLS client certificate. Another approach is to strengthen the Same Origin Policy of the browser by taking into account the security guarantees TLS gives. In this paper, we present a third approach which is of further interest beyond IDM protocols: we bind the SAML assertion to the TLS session that has been agreed upon between client and the service provider and thus provide anonymity of the browser. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/ARES.2010.89 |
| format | conference_proceeding |
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| fulltext | fulltext_linktorsrc |
| identifier | ISBN: 142445879X |
| ispartof | 2010 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2010, p.62-69 |
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| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_5438111 |
| source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings |
| subjects | Access protocols Authentication Computer security Cryptographic protocols Data security Domain Name System Federated Identity Management Identity management systems Internet Kerberos Public key SAML Single-Sign-On SSL TLS Web server |
| title | Secure Bindings of SAML Assertions to TLS Sessions |
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