Equilibrium analysis in imperfect traders' and GenCos' market

The paper models the strategic behavior of traders, GenCos and ISO using the multi-leader-follower framework. The outcomes of the strategic behavior of the players have been modeled using an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. From a policy perspective it is seen that allowing the GenC...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chitkara, Puneet, Jin Zhong
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Consumer electronics
Councils
Cournot conjectures
Electricity supply industry
Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
Gaussian processes
ISO standards
Law
Legal factors
Mathematical model
Mesh generation
multi-leader-follower games
Power generation
Strategic behavior
transmission rights
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Summary:The paper models the strategic behavior of traders, GenCos and ISO using the multi-leader-follower framework. The outcomes of the strategic behavior of the players have been modeled using an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. From a policy perspective it is seen that allowing the GenCos to hold FTRs may be welfare enhancing under certain demand conditions and ownership patterns of transmission rights and generation assets. The proposed model has been simulated on a 3 bus system.
ISSN:2160-8555
2160-8563
DOI:10.1109/TDC.2010.5484231