Cooperation enforcement for packet forwarding optimization in multi-hop ad-hoc networks

• Main Authors: Zayani, M-H, Zeghlache, D.
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Subjects: Ad hoc networks; cooperation; game theory; Games; Measurement; Nash equilibrium; Proposals; punishment scheme; repeated game; Routing protocols; self-learning
• ISSN: 1525-3511; 1558-2612
• DOI: 10.1109/WCNC.2012.6214100

Ad-hoc networks are independent of any infrastructure. The nodes are autonomous and make their own decisions. They also have limited energy resources. Thus, a node tends to behave selfishly when it is asked to forward the packets of other nodes. Indeed, it would rather choose to reject a forwarding request in order to save its energy. To overcome this problem, the nodes need to be motivated to cooperate. To this end, we propose a self-learning repeated game framework to enforce cooperation between the nodes of a network. This framework is inspired by the concept of "The Weakest Link" TV game. Each node has a utility function whose value depends on its cooperation in forwarding packets on a route as well as the cooperation of all the nodes that form this same route. The more these nodes cooperate the higher is their utility value. This would establish a cooperative spirit within the nodes of the networks. All the nodes will then more or less equally participate to the forwarding tasks which would then eventually guarantee a more efficient packets forwarding from sources to respective destinations. Simulations are run and the results show that the proposed framework efficiently enforces nodes to cooperate and outperforms two other self-learning repeated game frameworks which we are interested in.