Two Dimension Spectrum Allocation for Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, we develop a truthful and efficient combinatorial auction scheme under a novel spectrum allocation model that can achieve a worst-case approximation ratio \sqrt{m} in social welfare. We propose to tackle the dynamic spectrum access problem in cognitive radio (CR) networks with time-fr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on wireless communications 2014-03, Vol.13 (3), p.1410-1423
Main Authors: Li, Changle, Liu, Zhe, Geng, Xiaoyan, Dong, Mo, Yang, Feng, Gan, Xiaoying, Tian, Xiaohua, Wang, Xinbing
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithm design and analysis
Algorithms
Allocations
Applied sciences
Approximation
Approximation algorithms
Approximation methods
Auctions
Cognitive radio
Cognitive radio networks
Combinatorial analysis
combinatorial auction
Complexity
Cost accounting
Exact sciences and technology
Flexibility
Mathematical analysis
Networks
Organization, operation and development plans
Polynomials
Radiocommunication specific techniques
Radiocommunications
Resource management
Spectrum allocation
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Time-frequency analysis
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Summary:In this paper, we develop a truthful and efficient combinatorial auction scheme under a novel spectrum allocation model that can achieve a worst-case approximation ratio \sqrt{m} in social welfare. We propose to tackle the dynamic spectrum access problem in cognitive radio (CR) networks with time-frequency flexibility requirements. We model the spectrum opportunity in a time-frequency division manner and the spectrum allocation as a combinatorial auction. Then we design an auction mechanism to reach the upper bound in polynomial time and propose a combined approach to improve the bound in the cost of increasing computational complexity. A truthful payment that gives incentive to the SUs for revealing the truthful valuation of the desirable bundle of slots is presented. In order to reduce the complexity, we simplify the general model to a modified model that only allows frequency flexibility, and then present a truthful, optimal and computationally efficient auction mechanism. Extensive simulation results of the social welfare and spectrum ratio show that the performance of the combined approximation algorithm is better than the sorting based greedy algorithm.
ISSN:1536-1276
1558-2248
DOI:10.1109/TWC.2014.012814.130577