Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits

Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an eff...

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Main Authors: Maistri, P., Leveugle, R., Bossuet, L., Aubert, A., Fischer, V., Robisson, B., Moro, N., Maurine, P., Dutertre, J.-M, Lisart, M.
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Circuit faults
Clocks
Cryptography
Electromagnetics
Fault Attacks
Generators
Harmonic analysis
Probes
Secure implementations
Side Channel Analysis
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creator Maistri, P.
Leveugle, R.
Bossuet, L.
Aubert, A.
Fischer, V.
Robisson, B.
Moro, N.
Maurine, P.
Dutertre, J.-M
Lisart, M.
description Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2014.7004182
format conference_proceeding
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source IEEE Xplore All Conference Series
subjects Circuit faults
Clocks
Cryptography
Electromagnetics
Fault Attacks
Generators
Harmonic analysis
Probes
Secure implementations
Side Channel Analysis
title Electromagnetic analysis and fault injection onto secure circuits
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