Loading…

Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective

In this paper, we study the multiobjective optimization problem for green network routing. Although traditional commonly used multiobjective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one objective as a constraint...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE journal on selected areas in communications 2015-12, Vol.33 (12), p.2801-2814
Main Authors: Zhang, Xiaoning, Wang, Sheng, Zhao, Yangming, Xu, Shizhong, Wang, Xiong, Gao, Xiujiao, Qiao, Chunming
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3
container_end_page 2814
container_issue 12
container_start_page 2801
container_title IEEE journal on selected areas in communications
container_volume 33
creator Zhang, Xiaoning
Wang, Sheng
Zhao, Yangming
Xu, Shizhong
Wang, Xiong
Gao, Xiujiao
Qiao, Chunming
description In this paper, we study the multiobjective optimization problem for green network routing. Although traditional commonly used multiobjective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one objective as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff among all objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework, which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. Finally, to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed framework, we implement it into two multiobjective optimization cases for network green routing. The first case is load balancing and energy efficiency optimization for intradomain routing, and the second one is the energy efficiency optimization of two domains for interdomain routing.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481202
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_ieee_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_7274341</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>7274341</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>3883599751</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkE1Lw0AQhhdRsFZ_gHhZ8OIldT-zm2MpWpVqRdtz2KQT3Zpm626i6K93S8SDcxkYnnd4eRA6pWREKcku757HkxEjVI6Y0JQRtocGVEqdEEL0PhoQxXmiFU0P0VEIa0KoEJoN0PK-q1vrijWUrf0APN-2dmO_Tbw1uHIeTz1Agx-g_XT-DT-5rrXNC7YNnpoN4MUrOA-tLU2NH8GHbf_mGB1Upg5w8ruHaHl9tZjcJLP59HYyniUlZ2mbGEmYTAsWe4FImdQZMVUlY8uKg1itQLGMkYIwUTDKszRlNI6Rimsmhar4EF30f7fevXcQ2nxjQwl1bRpwXcipUprwTFEZ0fN_6Np1vontIsW15jyVIlK0p0rvQvBQ5VtvN8Z_5ZTkO9H5TnS-E53_io6Zsz5jAeCPV0wJLij_AYund6w</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1738833654</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective</title><source>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Journals</source><creator>Zhang, Xiaoning ; Wang, Sheng ; Zhao, Yangming ; Xu, Shizhong ; Wang, Xiong ; Gao, Xiujiao ; Qiao, Chunming</creator><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Xiaoning ; Wang, Sheng ; Zhao, Yangming ; Xu, Shizhong ; Wang, Xiong ; Gao, Xiujiao ; Qiao, Chunming</creatorcontrib><description>In this paper, we study the multiobjective optimization problem for green network routing. Although traditional commonly used multiobjective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one objective as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff among all objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework, which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. Finally, to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed framework, we implement it into two multiobjective optimization cases for network green routing. The first case is load balancing and energy efficiency optimization for intradomain routing, and the second one is the energy efficiency optimization of two domains for interdomain routing.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0733-8716</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1558-0008</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481202</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ISACEM</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Computer networks ; Energy consumption ; Energy efficiency ; Energy management ; Game theory ; Green Network ; Linear programming ; Load management ; Mathematical models ; Multi-Objective Optimization ; Nash Bargaining ; Negotiations ; Networks ; Objectives ; Optimization ; Pareto optimum ; Routing ; Routing (telecommunications) ; Sustainable development ; Telecommunications</subject><ispartof>IEEE journal on selected areas in communications, 2015-12, Vol.33 (12), p.2801-2814</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Dec 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7274341$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27903,27904,54774</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Xiaoning</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Sheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Yangming</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Shizhong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Xiong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gao, Xiujiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Qiao, Chunming</creatorcontrib><title>Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective</title><title>IEEE journal on selected areas in communications</title><addtitle>J-SAC</addtitle><description>In this paper, we study the multiobjective optimization problem for green network routing. Although traditional commonly used multiobjective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one objective as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff among all objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework, which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. Finally, to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed framework, we implement it into two multiobjective optimization cases for network green routing. The first case is load balancing and energy efficiency optimization for intradomain routing, and the second one is the energy efficiency optimization of two domains for interdomain routing.</description><subject>Computer networks</subject><subject>Energy consumption</subject><subject>Energy efficiency</subject><subject>Energy management</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Green Network</subject><subject>Linear programming</subject><subject>Load management</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Multi-Objective Optimization</subject><subject>Nash Bargaining</subject><subject>Negotiations</subject><subject>Networks</subject><subject>Objectives</subject><subject>Optimization</subject><subject>Pareto optimum</subject><subject>Routing</subject><subject>Routing (telecommunications)</subject><subject>Sustainable development</subject><subject>Telecommunications</subject><issn>0733-8716</issn><issn>1558-0008</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpdkE1Lw0AQhhdRsFZ_gHhZ8OIldT-zm2MpWpVqRdtz2KQT3Zpm626i6K93S8SDcxkYnnd4eRA6pWREKcku757HkxEjVI6Y0JQRtocGVEqdEEL0PhoQxXmiFU0P0VEIa0KoEJoN0PK-q1vrijWUrf0APN-2dmO_Tbw1uHIeTz1Agx-g_XT-DT-5rrXNC7YNnpoN4MUrOA-tLU2NH8GHbf_mGB1Upg5w8ruHaHl9tZjcJLP59HYyniUlZ2mbGEmYTAsWe4FImdQZMVUlY8uKg1itQLGMkYIwUTDKszRlNI6Rimsmhar4EF30f7fevXcQ2nxjQwl1bRpwXcipUprwTFEZ0fN_6Np1vontIsW15jyVIlK0p0rvQvBQ5VtvN8Z_5ZTkO9H5TnS-E53_io6Zsz5jAeCPV0wJLij_AYund6w</recordid><startdate>201512</startdate><enddate>201512</enddate><creator>Zhang, Xiaoning</creator><creator>Wang, Sheng</creator><creator>Zhao, Yangming</creator><creator>Xu, Shizhong</creator><creator>Wang, Xiong</creator><creator>Gao, Xiujiao</creator><creator>Qiao, Chunming</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>F28</scope><scope>FR3</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201512</creationdate><title>Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective</title><author>Zhang, Xiaoning ; Wang, Sheng ; Zhao, Yangming ; Xu, Shizhong ; Wang, Xiong ; Gao, Xiujiao ; Qiao, Chunming</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Computer networks</topic><topic>Energy consumption</topic><topic>Energy efficiency</topic><topic>Energy management</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Green Network</topic><topic>Linear programming</topic><topic>Load management</topic><topic>Mathematical models</topic><topic>Multi-Objective Optimization</topic><topic>Nash Bargaining</topic><topic>Negotiations</topic><topic>Networks</topic><topic>Objectives</topic><topic>Optimization</topic><topic>Pareto optimum</topic><topic>Routing</topic><topic>Routing (telecommunications)</topic><topic>Sustainable development</topic><topic>Telecommunications</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Xiaoning</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Sheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Yangming</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xu, Shizhong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Xiong</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gao, Xiujiao</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Qiao, Chunming</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE/IET Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Electronics &amp; Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>ANTE: Abstracts in New Technology &amp; Engineering</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><jtitle>IEEE journal on selected areas in communications</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Zhang, Xiaoning</au><au>Wang, Sheng</au><au>Zhao, Yangming</au><au>Xu, Shizhong</au><au>Wang, Xiong</au><au>Gao, Xiujiao</au><au>Qiao, Chunming</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective</atitle><jtitle>IEEE journal on selected areas in communications</jtitle><stitle>J-SAC</stitle><date>2015-12</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>33</volume><issue>12</issue><spage>2801</spage><epage>2814</epage><pages>2801-2814</pages><issn>0733-8716</issn><eissn>1558-0008</eissn><coden>ISACEM</coden><abstract>In this paper, we study the multiobjective optimization problem for green network routing. Although traditional commonly used multiobjective optimization methods can yield a Pareto efficient solution, they need to construct an aggregate objective function (AOF) or model one objective as a constraint in the optimization problem formulation. As a result, it is difficult to achieve a fair tradeoff among all objectives. Accordingly, we induce a Nash bargaining framework, which treats the two objectives as two virtual players in a game theoretic model, who negotiate how traffic should be routed to optimize both objectives. During the negotiation, each of them announces its performance threat value to reduce its cost, so the model is regarded as a threat value game. Our analysis shows that no agreement can be achieved if each player sets its threat value selfishly. To avoid such a negotiation break-down, we modify the threat value game to have a repeated process and design a mechanism to not only guarantee an agreement, but also generate a fair solution. Finally, to evaluate the efficiency of our proposed framework, we implement it into two multiobjective optimization cases for network green routing. The first case is load balancing and energy efficiency optimization for intradomain routing, and the second one is the energy efficiency optimization of two domains for interdomain routing.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481202</doi><tpages>14</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0733-8716
ispartof IEEE journal on selected areas in communications, 2015-12, Vol.33 (12), p.2801-2814
issn 0733-8716
1558-0008
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_7274341
source IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Journals
subjects Computer networks
Energy consumption
Energy efficiency
Energy management
Game theory
Green Network
Linear programming
Load management
Mathematical models
Multi-Objective Optimization
Nash Bargaining
Negotiations
Networks
Objectives
Optimization
Pareto optimum
Routing
Routing (telecommunications)
Sustainable development
Telecommunications
title Multiobjective Optimization for Green Network Routing in Game Theoretical Perspective
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-27T04%3A00%3A52IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_ieee_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Multiobjective%20Optimization%20for%20Green%20Network%20Routing%20in%20Game%20Theoretical%20Perspective&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20journal%20on%20selected%20areas%20in%20communications&rft.au=Zhang,%20Xiaoning&rft.date=2015-12&rft.volume=33&rft.issue=12&rft.spage=2801&rft.epage=2814&rft.pages=2801-2814&rft.issn=0733-8716&rft.eissn=1558-0008&rft.coden=ISACEM&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481202&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_ieee_%3E3883599751%3C/proquest_ieee_%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c326t-a50256b2871e4625890aff5716f3e4dde72920b024b21396621111a57382547f3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1738833654&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=7274341&rfr_iscdi=true