A decentralized mechanism for computing competitive equilibria in deregulated electricity markets

With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Miehling, Erik, Teneketzis, Demosthenis
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Companies
Conferences
Convergence
Decentralized
Decentralized control
Deregulation
Duality theory
Electricity
Electricity supply industry
Electronics
Load modeling
Markets
Network analysis and control
Optimization
Pareto optimality
Power systems
Power transmission lines
Online Access:Request full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants:generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
ISSN:2378-5861
DOI:10.1109/ACC.2016.7525567