Bayesian Stackelberg Game for Antijamming Transmission With Incomplete Information

The smart jammers pose a severe threat to wireless communications due to their abilities of learning the users' transmission strategies. A Stackelberg game can be formulated to model and analyze the hierarchical interactions between the user and the smart jammer. In this letter, an antijamming...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE communications letters 2016-10, Vol.20 (10), p.1991-1994
Main Authors: Jia, Luliang, Yao, Fuqiang, Sun, Youming, Niu, Yingtao, Zhu, Yonggang
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analytical models
Anti-jamming
Bayes methods
Games
incomplete information
Jamming
Optimization
power control
Receivers
Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg game
Uncertainty
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Summary:The smart jammers pose a severe threat to wireless communications due to their abilities of learning the users' transmission strategies. A Stackelberg game can be formulated to model and analyze the hierarchical interactions between the user and the smart jammer. In this letter, an antijamming Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information is proposed. In the proposed game, the user who acts as the leader has the privilege over the smart jammer and takes actions first, whereas the smart jammer acting as the follower moves subsequently. Moreover, the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is derived, and the existence and the uniqueness of SE are demonstrated. Simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed antijamming Bayesian Stackelberg game.
ISSN:1089-7798
1558-2558
DOI:10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2598808