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Fake VIP attacks and their mitigation via double-blind reputation
In a generic setting subsuming communication networks, resource sharing systems, and multi-agent communities, a client generates objects of various classes carrying class-dependent signatures, to which a server assigns class-dependent service quality. A Fake VIP attack consists in false declaration...
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Format: | Conference Proceeding |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Request full text |
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Summary: | In a generic setting subsuming communication networks, resource sharing systems, and multi-agent communities, a client generates objects of various classes carrying class-dependent signatures, to which a server assigns class-dependent service quality. A Fake VIP attack consists in false declaration of a high class, with an awareness that detection of object signature at the server side is costly and so invoked reluctantly. We show that such attacks can be mitigated by a server-side double-blind reputation scheme. We offer a minimum-information framework for Fake VIP attacks and a stochastic analysis of a two-player Stackelberg game to find optimum attack and defense strategies, as well as to identify regions of operation where both the client and the server find the reputation scheme beneficial. |
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ISSN: | 2474-154X |
DOI: | 10.1109/ATNAC.2017.8215385 |