An evolutionary model of Braess's paradox and the social welfare optimal solution

The Braess's paradox is the phenomenon that increasing the resources leads to the reduction of the overall welfare, originally proposed in the field of transportation. An evolutionary game model is proposed to explicitly depict the process of individual learning in this phenomenon. It can shows...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yu, Xianping, Wang, Kaiyue, Wang, Xin, Yu, Tongkui
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Braess's paradox
evolutionary game theory
road toll pricing
social welfare maximization
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Summary:The Braess's paradox is the phenomenon that increasing the resources leads to the reduction of the overall welfare, originally proposed in the field of transportation. An evolutionary game model is proposed to explicitly depict the process of individual learning in this phenomenon. It can shows clearly how the individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. A proper charging scheme is provided which can not only solve the Braess's paradox, but also maximize social welfare. This work provides inspiration for the policy to guide the self-interested individuals to achieve social welfare maximization.
ISSN:2639-4235
DOI:10.1109/ICCSS48103.2019.9115453