Loading…

A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems

Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE access 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883
Main Authors: Tu, Haicheng, Xia, Yongxiang, Tse, Chi K., Chen, Xi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393
container_end_page 114883
container_issue
container_start_page 114876
container_title IEEE access
container_volume 8
creator Tu, Haicheng
Xia, Yongxiang
Tse, Chi K.
Chen, Xi
description Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_ieee_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_9120058</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9120058</ieee_id><doaj_id>oai_doaj_org_article_5e48c7bed4dd467099a634f8c137dd1a</doaj_id><sourcerecordid>2454618234</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkF9LwzAUxYMoOOY-wV4KPncmvfnTgC-jTDeYOJg-hzRJtbMzM-mQfnurHcP7ksvhnHPDD6EpwTNCsLybF8Viu51lOMMzwBgggws0ygiXKTDgl__2azSJcYf7yXuJiRG6nyfLrgy1TYqudCGZt602H8mTt65JKh8GOd28d7E2ukk2_rt3bbvYun28QVeVbqKbnN4xen1YvBTLdP38uCrm69RQnLdp7miJhamYZJoSx7WQWIDIhQFBOWe4YiXllguDK04FWEY1WONKp63WIGGMVkOv9XqnDqHe69Apr2v1J_jwpnRoa9M4xRzNjSidpdZSLrCUmgOtckNAWEt033U7dB2C_zq62KqdP4bP_vsqo4xykmdAexcMLhN8jMFV56sEq1_qaqCufqmrE_U-NR1StXPunJAkw5jl8AMkknuR</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Website</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2454618234</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><source>IEEE Open Access Journals</source><creator>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</creator><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><description>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2169-3536</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2169-3536</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323</identifier><identifier>CODEN: IAECCG</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Piscataway: IEEE</publisher><subject>attack cost ; Availability ; cyber security ; Cyber-physical power system ; Cyberattack ; Cybersecurity ; differential evolution algorithm ; False alarms ; Integrity ; Mathematical model ; Meters ; Power systems ; SCADA systems ; State estimation ; Transmission line measurements</subject><ispartof>IEEE access, 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-1174-0245 ; 0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9120058$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,4010,27610,27900,27901,27902,54908</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yongxiang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tse, Chi K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><title>IEEE access</title><addtitle>Access</addtitle><description>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</description><subject>attack cost</subject><subject>Availability</subject><subject>cyber security</subject><subject>Cyber-physical power system</subject><subject>Cyberattack</subject><subject>Cybersecurity</subject><subject>differential evolution algorithm</subject><subject>False alarms</subject><subject>Integrity</subject><subject>Mathematical model</subject><subject>Meters</subject><subject>Power systems</subject><subject>SCADA systems</subject><subject>State estimation</subject><subject>Transmission line measurements</subject><issn>2169-3536</issn><issn>2169-3536</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ESBDL</sourceid><sourceid>DOA</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkF9LwzAUxYMoOOY-wV4KPncmvfnTgC-jTDeYOJg-hzRJtbMzM-mQfnurHcP7ksvhnHPDD6EpwTNCsLybF8Viu51lOMMzwBgggws0ygiXKTDgl__2azSJcYf7yXuJiRG6nyfLrgy1TYqudCGZt602H8mTt65JKh8GOd28d7E2ukk2_rt3bbvYun28QVeVbqKbnN4xen1YvBTLdP38uCrm69RQnLdp7miJhamYZJoSx7WQWIDIhQFBOWe4YiXllguDK04FWEY1WONKp63WIGGMVkOv9XqnDqHe69Apr2v1J_jwpnRoa9M4xRzNjSidpdZSLrCUmgOtckNAWEt033U7dB2C_zq62KqdP4bP_vsqo4xykmdAexcMLhN8jMFV56sEq1_qaqCufqmrE_U-NR1StXPunJAkw5jl8AMkknuR</recordid><startdate>2020</startdate><enddate>2020</enddate><creator>Tu, Haicheng</creator><creator>Xia, Yongxiang</creator><creator>Tse, Chi K.</creator><creator>Chen, Xi</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>ESBDL</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>7SR</scope><scope>8BQ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><scope>DOA</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1174-0245</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2020</creationdate><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><author>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>attack cost</topic><topic>Availability</topic><topic>cyber security</topic><topic>Cyber-physical power system</topic><topic>Cyberattack</topic><topic>Cybersecurity</topic><topic>differential evolution algorithm</topic><topic>False alarms</topic><topic>Integrity</topic><topic>Mathematical model</topic><topic>Meters</topic><topic>Power systems</topic><topic>SCADA systems</topic><topic>State estimation</topic><topic>Transmission line measurements</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yongxiang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tse, Chi K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE Open Access Journals</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998–Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Electronics &amp; Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Engineered Materials Abstracts</collection><collection>METADEX</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts – Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>IEEE access</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Tu, Haicheng</au><au>Xia, Yongxiang</au><au>Tse, Chi K.</au><au>Chen, Xi</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</atitle><jtitle>IEEE access</jtitle><stitle>Access</stitle><date>2020</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>8</volume><spage>114876</spage><epage>114883</epage><pages>114876-114883</pages><issn>2169-3536</issn><eissn>2169-3536</eissn><coden>IAECCG</coden><abstract>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</abstract><cop>Piscataway</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323</doi><tpages>8</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1174-0245</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 2169-3536
ispartof IEEE access, 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883
issn 2169-3536
2169-3536
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_9120058
source IEEE Open Access Journals
subjects attack cost
Availability
cyber security
Cyber-physical power system
Cyberattack
Cybersecurity
differential evolution algorithm
False alarms
Integrity
Mathematical model
Meters
Power systems
SCADA systems
State estimation
Transmission line measurements
title A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-31T23%3A06%3A32IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_ieee_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Hybrid%20Cyber%20Attack%20Model%20for%20Cyber-Physical%20Power%20Systems&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20access&rft.au=Tu,%20Haicheng&rft.date=2020&rft.volume=8&rft.spage=114876&rft.epage=114883&rft.pages=114876-114883&rft.issn=2169-3536&rft.eissn=2169-3536&rft.coden=IAECCG&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_ieee_%3E2454618234%3C/proquest_ieee_%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2454618234&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9120058&rfr_iscdi=true