Loading…
A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems
Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to...
Saved in:
Published in: | IEEE access 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393 |
---|---|
cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393 |
container_end_page | 114883 |
container_issue | |
container_start_page | 114876 |
container_title | IEEE access |
container_volume | 8 |
creator | Tu, Haicheng Xia, Yongxiang Tse, Chi K. Chen, Xi |
description | Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_ieee_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_9120058</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9120058</ieee_id><doaj_id>oai_doaj_org_article_5e48c7bed4dd467099a634f8c137dd1a</doaj_id><sourcerecordid>2454618234</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkF9LwzAUxYMoOOY-wV4KPncmvfnTgC-jTDeYOJg-hzRJtbMzM-mQfnurHcP7ksvhnHPDD6EpwTNCsLybF8Viu51lOMMzwBgggws0ygiXKTDgl__2azSJcYf7yXuJiRG6nyfLrgy1TYqudCGZt602H8mTt65JKh8GOd28d7E2ukk2_rt3bbvYun28QVeVbqKbnN4xen1YvBTLdP38uCrm69RQnLdp7miJhamYZJoSx7WQWIDIhQFBOWe4YiXllguDK04FWEY1WONKp63WIGGMVkOv9XqnDqHe69Apr2v1J_jwpnRoa9M4xRzNjSidpdZSLrCUmgOtckNAWEt033U7dB2C_zq62KqdP4bP_vsqo4xykmdAexcMLhN8jMFV56sEq1_qaqCufqmrE_U-NR1StXPunJAkw5jl8AMkknuR</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Website</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2454618234</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><source>IEEE Open Access Journals</source><creator>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</creator><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><description>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2169-3536</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2169-3536</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323</identifier><identifier>CODEN: IAECCG</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Piscataway: IEEE</publisher><subject>attack cost ; Availability ; cyber security ; Cyber-physical power system ; Cyberattack ; Cybersecurity ; differential evolution algorithm ; False alarms ; Integrity ; Mathematical model ; Meters ; Power systems ; SCADA systems ; State estimation ; Transmission line measurements</subject><ispartof>IEEE access, 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-1174-0245 ; 0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9120058$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,4010,27610,27900,27901,27902,54908</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yongxiang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tse, Chi K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><title>IEEE access</title><addtitle>Access</addtitle><description>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</description><subject>attack cost</subject><subject>Availability</subject><subject>cyber security</subject><subject>Cyber-physical power system</subject><subject>Cyberattack</subject><subject>Cybersecurity</subject><subject>differential evolution algorithm</subject><subject>False alarms</subject><subject>Integrity</subject><subject>Mathematical model</subject><subject>Meters</subject><subject>Power systems</subject><subject>SCADA systems</subject><subject>State estimation</subject><subject>Transmission line measurements</subject><issn>2169-3536</issn><issn>2169-3536</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ESBDL</sourceid><sourceid>DOA</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkF9LwzAUxYMoOOY-wV4KPncmvfnTgC-jTDeYOJg-hzRJtbMzM-mQfnurHcP7ksvhnHPDD6EpwTNCsLybF8Viu51lOMMzwBgggws0ygiXKTDgl__2azSJcYf7yXuJiRG6nyfLrgy1TYqudCGZt602H8mTt65JKh8GOd28d7E2ukk2_rt3bbvYun28QVeVbqKbnN4xen1YvBTLdP38uCrm69RQnLdp7miJhamYZJoSx7WQWIDIhQFBOWe4YiXllguDK04FWEY1WONKp63WIGGMVkOv9XqnDqHe69Apr2v1J_jwpnRoa9M4xRzNjSidpdZSLrCUmgOtckNAWEt033U7dB2C_zq62KqdP4bP_vsqo4xykmdAexcMLhN8jMFV56sEq1_qaqCufqmrE_U-NR1StXPunJAkw5jl8AMkknuR</recordid><startdate>2020</startdate><enddate>2020</enddate><creator>Tu, Haicheng</creator><creator>Xia, Yongxiang</creator><creator>Tse, Chi K.</creator><creator>Chen, Xi</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>ESBDL</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>7SR</scope><scope>8BQ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><scope>DOA</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1174-0245</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>2020</creationdate><title>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</title><author>Tu, Haicheng ; Xia, Yongxiang ; Tse, Chi K. ; Chen, Xi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>attack cost</topic><topic>Availability</topic><topic>cyber security</topic><topic>Cyber-physical power system</topic><topic>Cyberattack</topic><topic>Cybersecurity</topic><topic>differential evolution algorithm</topic><topic>False alarms</topic><topic>Integrity</topic><topic>Mathematical model</topic><topic>Meters</topic><topic>Power systems</topic><topic>SCADA systems</topic><topic>State estimation</topic><topic>Transmission line measurements</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Tu, Haicheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Xia, Yongxiang</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tse, Chi K.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Xi</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE Open Access Journals</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998–Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Engineered Materials Abstracts</collection><collection>METADEX</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><collection>DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>IEEE access</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Tu, Haicheng</au><au>Xia, Yongxiang</au><au>Tse, Chi K.</au><au>Chen, Xi</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems</atitle><jtitle>IEEE access</jtitle><stitle>Access</stitle><date>2020</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>8</volume><spage>114876</spage><epage>114883</epage><pages>114876-114883</pages><issn>2169-3536</issn><eissn>2169-3536</eissn><coden>IAECCG</coden><abstract>Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost.</abstract><cop>Piscataway</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323</doi><tpages>8</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1174-0245</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0462-3999</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 2169-3536 |
ispartof | IEEE access, 2020, Vol.8, p.114876-114883 |
issn | 2169-3536 2169-3536 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_ieee_primary_9120058 |
source | IEEE Open Access Journals |
subjects | attack cost Availability cyber security Cyber-physical power system Cyberattack Cybersecurity differential evolution algorithm False alarms Integrity Mathematical model Meters Power systems SCADA systems State estimation Transmission line measurements |
title | A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-31T23%3A06%3A32IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_ieee_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Hybrid%20Cyber%20Attack%20Model%20for%20Cyber-Physical%20Power%20Systems&rft.jtitle=IEEE%20access&rft.au=Tu,%20Haicheng&rft.date=2020&rft.volume=8&rft.spage=114876&rft.epage=114883&rft.pages=114876-114883&rft.issn=2169-3536&rft.eissn=2169-3536&rft.coden=IAECCG&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3003323&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_ieee_%3E2454618234%3C/proquest_ieee_%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c408t-8e4b07cf595a41e6a79073787c3746650f5b46d67c0f6473d54a3dcebeadaa393%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2454618234&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9120058&rfr_iscdi=true |