Private resource allocators and their applications

This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive called a private resource allocator (PRA) that can be used to allocate resources (e.g., network bandwidth, CPUs) to a set of clients without revealing to the clients whether any other clients received resources. We give several constructions of PRA...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Angel, Sebastian, Kannan, Sampath, Ratliff, Zachary
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Bandwidth
Metadata
Privacy
Protocols
Resource management
Side-channel attacks
Online Access:Request full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites
container_end_page 391
container_issue
container_start_page 372
container_title
container_volume
creator Angel, Sebastian
Kannan, Sampath
Ratliff, Zachary
description This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive called a private resource allocator (PRA) that can be used to allocate resources (e.g., network bandwidth, CPUs) to a set of clients without revealing to the clients whether any other clients received resources. We give several constructions of PRAs that provide guarantees ranging from information-theoretic to differential privacy. PRAs are useful in preventing a new class of attacks that we call allocation-based side-channel attacks. These attacks can be used, for example, to break the privacy guarantees of anonymous messaging systems that were designed specifically to defend against side-channel and traffic analysis attacks. Our implementation of PRAs in Alpenhorn, which is a recent anonymous messaging system, shows that PRAs increase the network resources required to start a conversation by up to 16× (can be made as low as 4× in some cases), but add no overhead once the conversation has been established.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/SP40000.2020.00065
format conference_proceeding
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>ieee_CHZPO</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_9152764</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9152764</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>9152764</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i247t-e49cd7b6229b8906454fbfb08a4cbe137addc0ec0ede364783a04bfd3c3797e33</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotjN1KxDAUhKMguK77AnqTF2g9SU57mktZ_IMFF9TrJT-nGKnbklTBt7egw8B8DMMIcaWgVgrszcseYVGtQUO9QNuciI2lTpHulEFLcCpW2lBTKQ10Li5K-YBlayyuhN7n9O1mlpnL-JUDSzcMY3DzmIt0xyjnd05Zumka0tKm8VguxVnvhsKb_1yLt_u71-1jtXt-eNre7qqkkeaK0YZIvtXa-s5Ciw32vvfQOQyelSEXYwBeHNm0SJ1xgL6PJhiyxMasxfXfb2Lmw5TTp8s_B6saTS2aX75ZRYo</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype></control><display><type>conference_proceeding</type><title>Private resource allocators and their applications</title><source>IEEE Xplore All Conference Series</source><creator>Angel, Sebastian ; Kannan, Sampath ; Ratliff, Zachary</creator><creatorcontrib>Angel, Sebastian ; Kannan, Sampath ; Ratliff, Zachary</creatorcontrib><description>This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive called a private resource allocator (PRA) that can be used to allocate resources (e.g., network bandwidth, CPUs) to a set of clients without revealing to the clients whether any other clients received resources. We give several constructions of PRAs that provide guarantees ranging from information-theoretic to differential privacy. PRAs are useful in preventing a new class of attacks that we call allocation-based side-channel attacks. These attacks can be used, for example, to break the privacy guarantees of anonymous messaging systems that were designed specifically to defend against side-channel and traffic analysis attacks. Our implementation of PRAs in Alpenhorn, which is a recent anonymous messaging system, shows that PRAs increase the network resources required to start a conversation by up to 16× (can be made as low as 4× in some cases), but add no overhead once the conversation has been established.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2375-1207</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9781728134970</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 1728134978</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/SP40000.2020.00065</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Bandwidth ; Metadata ; Privacy ; Protocols ; Resource management ; Side-channel attacks</subject><ispartof>2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2020, p.372-391</ispartof><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152764$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,780,784,789,790,27925,54555,54932</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152764$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Angel, Sebastian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kannan, Sampath</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ratliff, Zachary</creatorcontrib><title>Private resource allocators and their applications</title><title>2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</title><addtitle>SP</addtitle><description>This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive called a private resource allocator (PRA) that can be used to allocate resources (e.g., network bandwidth, CPUs) to a set of clients without revealing to the clients whether any other clients received resources. We give several constructions of PRAs that provide guarantees ranging from information-theoretic to differential privacy. PRAs are useful in preventing a new class of attacks that we call allocation-based side-channel attacks. These attacks can be used, for example, to break the privacy guarantees of anonymous messaging systems that were designed specifically to defend against side-channel and traffic analysis attacks. Our implementation of PRAs in Alpenhorn, which is a recent anonymous messaging system, shows that PRAs increase the network resources required to start a conversation by up to 16× (can be made as low as 4× in some cases), but add no overhead once the conversation has been established.</description><subject>Bandwidth</subject><subject>Metadata</subject><subject>Privacy</subject><subject>Protocols</subject><subject>Resource management</subject><subject>Side-channel attacks</subject><issn>2375-1207</issn><isbn>9781728134970</isbn><isbn>1728134978</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><recordid>eNotjN1KxDAUhKMguK77AnqTF2g9SU57mktZ_IMFF9TrJT-nGKnbklTBt7egw8B8DMMIcaWgVgrszcseYVGtQUO9QNuciI2lTpHulEFLcCpW2lBTKQ10Li5K-YBlayyuhN7n9O1mlpnL-JUDSzcMY3DzmIt0xyjnd05Zumka0tKm8VguxVnvhsKb_1yLt_u71-1jtXt-eNre7qqkkeaK0YZIvtXa-s5Ciw32vvfQOQyelSEXYwBeHNm0SJ1xgL6PJhiyxMasxfXfb2Lmw5TTp8s_B6saTS2aX75ZRYo</recordid><startdate>20200501</startdate><enddate>20200501</enddate><creator>Angel, Sebastian</creator><creator>Kannan, Sampath</creator><creator>Ratliff, Zachary</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IH</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIO</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200501</creationdate><title>Private resource allocators and their applications</title><author>Angel, Sebastian ; Kannan, Sampath ; Ratliff, Zachary</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i247t-e49cd7b6229b8906454fbfb08a4cbe137addc0ec0ede364783a04bfd3c3797e33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Bandwidth</topic><topic>Metadata</topic><topic>Privacy</topic><topic>Protocols</topic><topic>Resource management</topic><topic>Side-channel attacks</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Angel, Sebastian</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kannan, Sampath</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ratliff, Zachary</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan (POP) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore (Online service)</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP) 1998-present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Angel, Sebastian</au><au>Kannan, Sampath</au><au>Ratliff, Zachary</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Private resource allocators and their applications</atitle><btitle>2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</btitle><stitle>SP</stitle><date>2020-05-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><spage>372</spage><epage>391</epage><pages>372-391</pages><eissn>2375-1207</eissn><eisbn>9781728134970</eisbn><eisbn>1728134978</eisbn><abstract>This paper introduces a new cryptographic primitive called a private resource allocator (PRA) that can be used to allocate resources (e.g., network bandwidth, CPUs) to a set of clients without revealing to the clients whether any other clients received resources. We give several constructions of PRAs that provide guarantees ranging from information-theoretic to differential privacy. PRAs are useful in preventing a new class of attacks that we call allocation-based side-channel attacks. These attacks can be used, for example, to break the privacy guarantees of anonymous messaging systems that were designed specifically to defend against side-channel and traffic analysis attacks. Our implementation of PRAs in Alpenhorn, which is a recent anonymous messaging system, shows that PRAs increase the network resources required to start a conversation by up to 16× (can be made as low as 4× in some cases), but add no overhead once the conversation has been established.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/SP40000.2020.00065</doi><tpages>20</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier EISSN: 2375-1207
ispartof 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2020, p.372-391
issn 2375-1207
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_9152764
source IEEE Xplore All Conference Series
subjects Bandwidth
Metadata
Privacy
Protocols
Resource management
Side-channel attacks
title Private resource allocators and their applications
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-28T22%3A46%3A45IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee_CHZPO&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.atitle=Private%20resource%20allocators%20and%20their%20applications&rft.btitle=2020%20IEEE%20Symposium%20on%20Security%20and%20Privacy%20(SP)&rft.au=Angel,%20Sebastian&rft.date=2020-05-01&rft.spage=372&rft.epage=391&rft.pages=372-391&rft.eissn=2375-1207&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/SP40000.2020.00065&rft.eisbn=9781728134970&rft.eisbn_list=1728134978&rft_dat=%3Cieee_CHZPO%3E9152764%3C/ieee_CHZPO%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i247t-e49cd7b6229b8906454fbfb08a4cbe137addc0ec0ede364783a04bfd3c3797e33%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9152764&rfr_iscdi=true