Loading…

Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition

We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech, Fischlin, Marc, Warinschi, Bogdan
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Citations: Items that cite this one
Online Access:Request full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-1077b987010a54efb3a4d885e57cd17211c65fdf934b06423cf6a65ebdb483353
cites
container_end_page 303
container_issue
container_start_page 288
container_title
container_volume
creator de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech
Fischlin, Marc
Warinschi, Bogdan
description We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00028
format conference_proceeding
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>ieee_CHZPO</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_9155094</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9155094</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>9155094</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-1077b987010a54efb3a4d885e57cd17211c65fdf934b06423cf6a65ebdb483353</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotjstKAzEYRqMgWGufoJs8gDP-f-5xV8ZWxYLgZV0ymcRG2kxpRrBvr1ZXZ3EOHx8hU4QaEex187IQFoWuGTCoAYCZEzKx2qBmBpXUDE_JiHEtKsOBn5OLUj4AFFhkI7KYfQ7rkIfk3ZD6TFOmj-FQzb_82uX3cENvQ0w5_bpyRZ_D5pgV6nJHm36768vRXZKz6DYlTP45Jm-L-WtzXy2f7h6a2bLyXImhQtC6tUYDgpMixJY70Rkjg9S--_mL6JWMXbRctKAE4z4qp2Rou1YYziUfk-nfbgohrHb7tHX7w8qilGAF_wYF7kuA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype></control><display><type>conference_proceeding</type><title>Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition</title><source>IEEE Xplore All Conference Series</source><creator>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech ; Fischlin, Marc ; Warinschi, Bogdan</creator><creatorcontrib>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech ; Fischlin, Marc ; Warinschi, Bogdan</creatorcontrib><description>We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2374-8303</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9781728165721</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 1728165725</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00028</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Authentication ; Computer science ; Games ; Protocols ; Resistance</subject><ispartof>2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2020, p.288-303</ispartof><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-1077b987010a54efb3a4d885e57cd17211c65fdf934b06423cf6a65ebdb483353</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9155094$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,776,780,785,786,27902,54530,54907</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9155094$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fischlin, Marc</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Warinschi, Bogdan</creatorcontrib><title>Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition</title><title>2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)</title><addtitle>CSF</addtitle><description>We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.</description><subject>Authentication</subject><subject>Computer science</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Protocols</subject><subject>Resistance</subject><issn>2374-8303</issn><isbn>9781728165721</isbn><isbn>1728165725</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><recordid>eNotjstKAzEYRqMgWGufoJs8gDP-f-5xV8ZWxYLgZV0ymcRG2kxpRrBvr1ZXZ3EOHx8hU4QaEex187IQFoWuGTCoAYCZEzKx2qBmBpXUDE_JiHEtKsOBn5OLUj4AFFhkI7KYfQ7rkIfk3ZD6TFOmj-FQzb_82uX3cENvQ0w5_bpyRZ_D5pgV6nJHm36768vRXZKz6DYlTP45Jm-L-WtzXy2f7h6a2bLyXImhQtC6tUYDgpMixJY70Rkjg9S--_mL6JWMXbRctKAE4z4qp2Rou1YYziUfk-nfbgohrHb7tHX7w8qilGAF_wYF7kuA</recordid><startdate>20200601</startdate><enddate>20200601</enddate><creator>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech</creator><creator>Fischlin, Marc</creator><creator>Warinschi, Bogdan</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IL</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIL</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200601</creationdate><title>Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition</title><author>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech ; Fischlin, Marc ; Warinschi, Bogdan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-1077b987010a54efb3a4d885e57cd17211c65fdf934b06423cf6a65ebdb483353</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Authentication</topic><topic>Computer science</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Protocols</topic><topic>Resistance</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Fischlin, Marc</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Warinschi, Bogdan</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan All Online (POP All Online) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE/IET Electronic Library (IEL) - Journals and E-Books</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP All) 1998-Present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>de Saint Guilhem, Cyprien Delpech</au><au>Fischlin, Marc</au><au>Warinschi, Bogdan</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition</atitle><btitle>2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)</btitle><stitle>CSF</stitle><date>2020-06-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><spage>288</spage><epage>303</epage><pages>288-303</pages><eissn>2374-8303</eissn><eisbn>9781728165721</eisbn><eisbn>1728165725</eisbn><abstract>We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first discuss these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models. We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00028</doi><tpages>16</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier EISSN: 2374-8303
ispartof 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2020, p.288-303
issn 2374-8303
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_9155094
source IEEE Xplore All Conference Series
subjects Authentication
Computer science
Games
Protocols
Resistance
title Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-10T13%3A28%3A23IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee_CHZPO&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.atitle=Authentication%20in%20Key-Exchange:%20Definitions,%20Relations%20and%20Composition&rft.btitle=2020%20IEEE%2033rd%20Computer%20Security%20Foundations%20Symposium%20(CSF)&rft.au=de%20Saint%20Guilhem,%20Cyprien%20Delpech&rft.date=2020-06-01&rft.spage=288&rft.epage=303&rft.pages=288-303&rft.eissn=2374-8303&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00028&rft.eisbn=9781728165721&rft.eisbn_list=1728165725&rft_dat=%3Cieee_CHZPO%3E9155094%3C/ieee_CHZPO%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-1077b987010a54efb3a4d885e57cd17211c65fdf934b06423cf6a65ebdb483353%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9155094&rfr_iscdi=true