Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols

Data and signal authentication schemes are being proposed to address Global Navigation Satellite Systems' (GNSS) vulnerability to spoofing. Due to the low power of their signals, the bandwidth available for authentication in GNSS is scarce. Since delayed-disclosure protocols, e.g., TESLA (timed...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on aerospace and electronic systems 2021-06, Vol.57 (3), p.1827-1839
Main Authors: Fernandez-Hernandez, Ignacio, Ashur, Tomer, Rijmen, Vincent
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Authentication
Bandwidths
Cryptography
Failure analysis
Forgery
Global navigation satellite system
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
Media Access Protocol
Navigation satellites
Protocols
Satellite broadcasting
Spoofing
timed-efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA)
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Summary:Data and signal authentication schemes are being proposed to address Global Navigation Satellite Systems' (GNSS) vulnerability to spoofing. Due to the low power of their signals, the bandwidth available for authentication in GNSS is scarce. Since delayed-disclosure protocols, e.g., TESLA (timed-efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication), are efficient in terms of bandwidth and robust to signal impairments, they have been proposed and implemented by GNSS. The length of message authentication codes (MACs) and cryptographic keys are two crucial aspects of the protocol design as they have an impact on the utilized bandwidth, and therefore on the protocol performance. We analyze both aspects in detail for GNSS-TESLA and present recommendations for efficient yet safe MAC and key lengths. We further complement this analysis by proposing possible authentication success and failure policies and quantify the reduction of the attack surface resulting from employing them. The analysis shows that in some cases it is safe to use MAC and key sizes that are smaller than those proposed in best-practice guidelines. While some of our considerations are general to delayed-disclosure lightweight protocols for data and signal authentication, we particularize them for GNSS-TESLA protocols.
ISSN:0018-9251
1557-9603
DOI:10.1109/TAES.2021.3053129