Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the m...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Singhal, Shiksha, Kavitha, Veeraruna, Nair, Jayakrishnan
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Conferences
Economies of scale
Games
Stability analysis
Systematics
Online Access:Request full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites
container_end_page 3817
container_issue
container_start_page 3812
container_title
container_volume
creator Singhal, Shiksha
Kavitha, Veeraruna
Nair, Jayakrishnan
description We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. Instead, the stable configurations are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. We analyse the stable duopolies that emerge from this interaction.
doi_str_mv 10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683595
format conference_proceeding
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>ieee_CHZPO</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_ieee_primary_9683595</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>9683595</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>9683595</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-fac4d69cf413db4ebb72715079cea5e46f5c216223fb7aafd9d9775ef36ec66b3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotj81KAzEURqMgWGufQIR5gRmT3ORmspRoq1CQUl2XJHMjkc6MzM_Ct1dsV985mwMfY_eCV0Jw--CenNKqVpXkUlQWa9BWX7CVNbVA1Arwzy_ZQmqDpQTDr9nNOH5xDtYqWDDpen_MU-67Yt0Prf-n3BWu78bJd1Oxn9tiN9NMufssNr6l8ZZdJX8caXXeJftYP7-7l3L7tnl1j9sySw5TmXxUDdqYlIAmKArBSCM0NzaS16Qw6SgFSgkpGO9TYxtrjKYESBExwJLdnbqZiA7fQ2798HM4X4RfIJpFzQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Publisher</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype></control><display><type>conference_proceeding</type><title>Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games</title><source>IEEE Xplore All Conference Series</source><creator>Singhal, Shiksha ; Kavitha, Veeraruna ; Nair, Jayakrishnan</creator><creatorcontrib>Singhal, Shiksha ; Kavitha, Veeraruna ; Nair, Jayakrishnan</creatorcontrib><description>We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. Instead, the stable configurations are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. We analyse the stable duopolies that emerge from this interaction.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2576-2370</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 9781665436595</identifier><identifier>EISBN: 166543659X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683595</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>IEEE</publisher><subject>Conferences ; Economies of scale ; Games ; Stability analysis ; Systematics</subject><ispartof>2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2021, p.3812-3817</ispartof><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9683595$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>309,310,780,784,789,790,27925,54555,54932</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9683595$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Singhal, Shiksha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kavitha, Veeraruna</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nair, Jayakrishnan</creatorcontrib><title>Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games</title><title>2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)</title><addtitle>CDC</addtitle><description>We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. Instead, the stable configurations are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. We analyse the stable duopolies that emerge from this interaction.</description><subject>Conferences</subject><subject>Economies of scale</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Stability analysis</subject><subject>Systematics</subject><issn>2576-2370</issn><isbn>9781665436595</isbn><isbn>166543659X</isbn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>conference_proceeding</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>conference_proceeding</recordtype><sourceid>6IE</sourceid><recordid>eNotj81KAzEURqMgWGufQIR5gRmT3ORmspRoq1CQUl2XJHMjkc6MzM_Ct1dsV985mwMfY_eCV0Jw--CenNKqVpXkUlQWa9BWX7CVNbVA1Arwzy_ZQmqDpQTDr9nNOH5xDtYqWDDpen_MU-67Yt0Prf-n3BWu78bJd1Oxn9tiN9NMufssNr6l8ZZdJX8caXXeJftYP7-7l3L7tnl1j9sySw5TmXxUDdqYlIAmKArBSCM0NzaS16Qw6SgFSgkpGO9TYxtrjKYESBExwJLdnbqZiA7fQ2798HM4X4RfIJpFzQ</recordid><startdate>20211214</startdate><enddate>20211214</enddate><creator>Singhal, Shiksha</creator><creator>Kavitha, Veeraruna</creator><creator>Nair, Jayakrishnan</creator><general>IEEE</general><scope>6IE</scope><scope>6IH</scope><scope>CBEJK</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>RIO</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20211214</creationdate><title>Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games</title><author>Singhal, Shiksha ; Kavitha, Veeraruna ; Nair, Jayakrishnan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-fac4d69cf413db4ebb72715079cea5e46f5c216223fb7aafd9d9775ef36ec66b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>conference_proceedings</rsrctype><prefilter>conference_proceedings</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Conferences</topic><topic>Economies of scale</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Stability analysis</topic><topic>Systematics</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Singhal, Shiksha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Kavitha, Veeraruna</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nair, Jayakrishnan</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plan (POP) 1998-present by volume</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore All Conference Proceedings</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore</collection><collection>IEEE Proceedings Order Plans (POP) 1998-present</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Singhal, Shiksha</au><au>Kavitha, Veeraruna</au><au>Nair, Jayakrishnan</au><format>book</format><genre>proceeding</genre><ristype>CONF</ristype><atitle>Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games</atitle><btitle>2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)</btitle><stitle>CDC</stitle><date>2021-12-14</date><risdate>2021</risdate><spage>3812</spage><epage>3817</epage><pages>3812-3817</pages><eissn>2576-2370</eissn><eisbn>9781665436595</eisbn><eisbn>166543659X</eisbn><abstract>We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the total size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. Instead, the stable configurations are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. We analyse the stable duopolies that emerge from this interaction.</abstract><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683595</doi><tpages>6</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext_linktorsrc
identifier EISSN: 2576-2370
ispartof 2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2021, p.3812-3817
issn 2576-2370
language eng
recordid cdi_ieee_primary_9683595
source IEEE Xplore All Conference Series
subjects Conferences
Economies of scale
Games
Stability analysis
Systematics
title Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-02T09%3A23%3A48IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-ieee_CHZPO&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=proceeding&rft.atitle=Coalition%20Formation%20in%20Constant%20Sum%20Queueing%20Games&rft.btitle=2021%2060th%20IEEE%20Conference%20on%20Decision%20and%20Control%20(CDC)&rft.au=Singhal,%20Shiksha&rft.date=2021-12-14&rft.spage=3812&rft.epage=3817&rft.pages=3812-3817&rft.eissn=2576-2370&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683595&rft.eisbn=9781665436595&rft.eisbn_list=166543659X&rft_dat=%3Cieee_CHZPO%3E9683595%3C/ieee_CHZPO%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-i203t-fac4d69cf413db4ebb72715079cea5e46f5c216223fb7aafd9d9775ef36ec66b3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=9683595&rfr_iscdi=true