Tail Time Defense Against Website Fingerprinting Attacks

In the past few years, many defense mechanisms have been proposed against website fingerprinting attacks. Walkie-Talkie (WT) built on top of the Tor network is known to be one of the most effective defense mechanisms. However, we observed that WT significantly increases the page loading time (time o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE access 2022, Vol.10, p.18516-18525
Main Authors: Liang, Jingyuan, Yu, Chansu, Suh, Kyoungwon, Han, Hyoil
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bandwidth
Censorship
Defense mechanisms
Electronic mail
Fingerprinting
Half-duplex system
Loading
machine learning
Pallets
Protocols
Servers
tor
user perceived experience
Website fingerprinting
Websites
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Summary:In the past few years, many defense mechanisms have been proposed against website fingerprinting attacks. Walkie-Talkie (WT) built on top of the Tor network is known to be one of the most effective defense mechanisms. However, we observed that WT significantly increases the page loading time (time overhead) although the bandwidth overhead is not high. This paper analyzes the cause of the increased page loading time and presents a defending approach called Tail Time (TT), which addresses the problem by limiting the maximum time for which a pending request can block subsequent requests. Our experimental results indicate that the proposed TT defense can significantly reduce the page loading time while keeping the defense performance on par.
ISSN:2169-3536
2169-3536
DOI:10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3146236