The mechanism of representation of regional interests at the federal level in Russia: Problems and solutions

The low functional effectiveness of institutions of regional representation is an urgent issue for the Russian political system. The Russian system of bi-cameralism is in crisis because the Federation Council has, to a large extent, lost its function as a body of authority representing regional inte...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Perspectives on European politics and society 2007-04, Vol.8 (1), p.73-97
Main Author: Turovsky, Rostislav
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Balance of Power
bicameralism
centralization
clientelism
Effectiveness
Federal Government
federalism
interest groups
Legislative Bodies
Legislators
Political Systems
regional lobbyism
regional participation
Regional policy
Representation
Russia
uneven development
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The low functional effectiveness of institutions of regional representation is an urgent issue for the Russian political system. The Russian system of bi-cameralism is in crisis because the Federation Council has, to a large extent, lost its function as a body of authority representing regional interests due to the current practices of delegating senators. There are also problems related to the role of the Federation Council in the law-making process and division of competencies between the two houses of the Russian parliament. The fact that it has become virtually impossible to create regional parties in Russia is yet another obstacle for regional representation. The functions of the State Council and the Council of Lawmakers are very limited, not specified in legislation and reduced to the purely consultative. As a result, the balance in the centre-region relations is distorted, though retaining situational stability because of the absence of meaningful regional impulses able to offset the balance of power.
ISSN:1570-5854
1568-0258
DOI:10.1080/15705850701204129