Why Democracy Survives Presidential Encroachments: Argentina Since 1983

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative politics 2023-07, Vol.55 (4), p.525-548
Main Authors: García Holgado, Benjamín, Mainwaring, Scott
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Democracy
Democratic Breakdown
Democratic Erosion
Executive Takeover
Illiberalism
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Summary:This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy
ISSN:0010-4159
DOI:10.5129/001041523X16729343375086