Countermeasure against probabilistic blinding attack in practical quantum key distribution systems Project supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant Nos. 2011CBA00200 and 2011CB921200), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61475148, 61201239, 61205118, and 11304397), and the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2013M540514)

In a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector, can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Chinese physics B 2015-08, Vol.24 (9)
Main Authors: Qian, Yong-Jun, Li, Hong-Wei, He, De-Yong, Yin, Zhen-Qiang, Zhang, Chun-Mei, Chen, Wei, Wang, Shuang, Han, Zheng-Fu
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
countermeasure bound
probabilistic blinding attack
quantum key distribution
single-photon detector
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:In a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector, can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.
ISSN:1674-1056
DOI:10.1088/1674-1056/24/9/090305