The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation

I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientifi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2010-01, Vol.77 (1), p.35-58
Main Author: Frost‐Arnold, Greg
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Empirical evidence
Empiricism
Entelechy
Explanation
Inference
Knowledge
Mathematical realism
Methodology
Naturalism
Opium
Philosophical realism
Philosophy of science
Quantum mechanics
Realism
Science
Scientific realism
Scientific thought
Scientists
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Summary:I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/650207