Induction over Strategic Agents

We study the problem where a decision maker needs to discover a classification rule to classify intelligent, self-interested agents. Agents may engage in strategic behavior to alter their characteristics for a favorable classification. We show how the decision maker can induce a classification rule...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Information systems research 2010-03, Vol.21 (1), p.170-189
Main Authors: Boylu, Fidan, Aytug, Haldun, Koehler, Gary J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
adversarial learning
Agents
Behavior
Classification
Data mining
Datasets
Decision making
Discriminant analysis
Game theory
generalization
Hyperplanes
Information storage and retrieval systems
Machine learning
Mathematical vectors
Nash equilibrium
Optimal solutions
principal-agent
Strategic behavior
strategic gaming
Studies
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Summary:We study the problem where a decision maker needs to discover a classification rule to classify intelligent, self-interested agents. Agents may engage in strategic behavior to alter their characteristics for a favorable classification. We show how the decision maker can induce a classification rule that anticipates such behavior while still satisfying an important risk minimization principle.
ISSN:1047-7047
1526-5536
DOI:10.1287/isre.1090.0272