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The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions

This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Owing to the anonymity of a large labor market, workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs. This randomness generates coordination frictions. Two workers may apply for a particular job, whereas an identical jo...

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Published in:	The Journal of political economy 2005-10, Vol.113 (5), p.996-1025
Main Author:	Shimer, Robert
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Comparative advantage Competitive equilibrium Decentralization Economic Factors Economic impact Economic models Economic theory Employees Hiring Job Applicants Job Application Job hunting Job Placement Labor economics Labor Market Labor Supply Labour market Marginal value Political economy Production functions Productivity Regression analysis Studies Unemployment Wages Welfare Workers
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container_end_page	1025
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container_title	The Journal of political economy
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description	This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Owing to the anonymity of a large labor market, workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs. This randomness generates coordination frictions. Two workers may apply for a particular job, whereas an identical job gets no applications. The model generates assortative matching, with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers’ and firms’ types. It predicts that a worker’s wage is increasing in her job’s productivity and a firm’s profit is increasing in its employees’ productivity. The model also yields a version of the welfare theorems.
doi_str_mv	10.1086/444551
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source	EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); EBSCOhost Econlit with Full Text; JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; ERIC; University of Chicago Press Journals
subjects	Comparative advantage Competitive equilibrium Decentralization Economic Factors Economic impact Economic models Economic theory Employees Hiring Job Applicants Job Application Job hunting Job Placement Labor economics Labor Market Labor Supply Labour market Marginal value Political economy Production functions Productivity Regression analysis Studies Unemployment Wages Welfare Workers
title	The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
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