AMERIKAANSE ANALYTISCHE FILOSOFIE: FILOSOFIE ALS LOGISCH PRAGMATISCH RECONSTRUCTIONISME

• Published in: Tijdschrift voor filosofie 1966-09, Vol.28 (3), p.418-440
• Main Author: DOORMAN, S. J.
• Format: Article
• Language: dut
• ISSN: 1370-575X

In this article the author gives a rather sketchy exposition of some problems which characterise the present discussion in the American school of analytic philosophy. Although the geographical distinctions are not to be stressed too far, it may be observed that the American intellectual inheritors of the Wiener Kreis tend to look upon the use of methods of formal reconstruction in philosophy with considerably more positive expectation than most of their English colleagues. Following Karl Popper, the problem of cognitive significance is introduced by considering two dichotomies : (D1) Scientific propositions vs. metaphysical propositions (D2) Meaningful propositions vs. nonsensical propositions The anti-metaphysical dogmatism of the early logical positivists can be defined in terms of the unexamined presupposition that (D1) is coextensive with (D2). The techniques employed by the philosophers considered in this article are described by explaining consecutively the three qualifications mentioned in the title, to wit : (1) The use of formal methods in constructing ideal languages. (2) The use of pragmatic considerations in evaluating the decisions made on the choice of linguistic frameworks. (3) Philosophical explication of ambiguous terms by reconstructing them in a syntactically well-defined ideal language. Problems of the type mentioned under (2) came to the fore owing to discoveries which nullified the belief in the possibility of the construction of one universal scientific language. Further relativisations were forced upon the formalists by the actual attempts to carry out the reconstructionist program with respect to basic problems in the philosophy of science. It is argued that the liberalisation of the empiricist doctrine can have important consequences for the problem how to overcome the present controversy between analytically and existentially oriented philosophers. By taking into account in what respects the intimate link between (D1) and (D2) is loosened, by attempting to construct fair interpretations of the opposed doctrines, and by creating more possibilities of fruitful feed-back of information between the opposed camps, a way may be found to escape the present unfortunately divided state of philosophy.