Die altruistische Einstellung

• Published in: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik = Annual review of law and ethics 1998-01, Vol.6, p.73-92
• Main Author: Dahlstrom, Daniel O.
• Format: Article
• Language: ger
• Subjects: The Concept and History of Altruism and Supererogation
• ISSN: 0944-4610

This essay takes a critical look at a specific altruistic interpretation of the moral nature, legitimacy, and value of unselfish actions. The aim of the essay is to raise questions about this altruistic attitude toward the morality of unselfish actions by focussing on certain assumptions that inform that attitude. It is argued that, among those assumptions, the most counterintuitive and deleterious is the notion that the morality of an unselfish action can and should be established by appeal to the possibility of resentment springing from (as the case may be) the performance or non-performance of the action. After a short presentation and explanation of these assumptions and their questionableness (Part I), the essay investigates the extent to which an altruistic attitude animates contemporary discussion of the moral character of unselfish actions. This investigation (Part II) is limited to a sketch of a particular development of contemporary ethical theory, from (1) Thomas Nagel's initial attempt to explain the possibility of pure altruism to (2) his revisions of his early theory into a concept of a revised altruism, and culminating in (3) the intersubjective altruism, elaborated by Christine Korsgaard as a consequence of her critique of Nagel's moral theory. In conclusion (Part III), after iterating the fundamental inadequacy of appeals to possibilities of resentment, an explanation for the altruistic attitude is ventured. This explanation tries to secure the measure of validity of the assumptions of the altruistic attitude as well as its limitations by suggesting its grounding in an ethics of honor, delimited by an ethics of love and friendship.