IL RAZIONALISMO ETICO DI ERMINIO JUVALTA E I SUOI LIMITI

• Published in: Rivista di storia della filosofia (Milan, Italy : 1984) Italy : 1984), 1986-01, Vol.41 (3), p.513-541
• Main Author: Pontara, Giuliano
• Format: Article
• Language: Italian
• Subjects: STUDI
• ISSN: 0393-2516; 1972-5558

In this essay I examine the meta-ethical theory formulated by the Italian philosopher Erminio Juvalta. In a series of impressive writings, published in the period between 1901 and 1929, this interesting yet little known scholar, supported the view that ethical judgements are "directive", "supreme", "universal" and universalizable, and that, unlike "theoretical judgements" lack truth-values, fuvalta argued that this view of the nature of ethical judgements is, within certain limits, compatible with the possibility of rational argument in ethical matters, and hence also compatible with the claim of the possibility of "a normative moral science" aiming at establishing plausible moral principles. In the present essay this thesis is discussed and eventually rejected. Is is argued that the reasons on which Juvalta would seem to rest his view that ethical judgments lack truth-values are not good ones. It is further argued that the thesis of the universality of ethical judgments should be kept distinct from the thesis of universalizability and that the former cannot be construed as a logical thesis on the basis of a prescriptive theory such as that held by Juvalta (and later by Hare). The essay ends with a brief discussion of the moral theory proposed by Juvalta (which has striking similarities with that developed more recently by J. Rawls).