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Jemaah Islamiyah After the 2002 Bali Bombings: Two Decades of Continuity and Transformation

Two decades on from the 2002 Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has transformed into a fullfledged hybrid militant group that operates on three main fronts: social (i.e. school and dakwah, or religious outreach), military and political. Whilst JI’s social and military fronts have continuously feat...

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Published in:Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 2022-09, Vol.14 (5), p.17-28
Main Author: Arianti, V.
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description Two decades on from the 2002 Bali bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has transformed into a fullfledged hybrid militant group that operates on three main fronts: social (i.e. school and dakwah, or religious outreach), military and political. Whilst JI’s social and military fronts have continuously featured in the group’s operations since 1993, its establishment of a political wing more recently – embracing democracy and participating in Indonesian political parties – signals the group is possibly learning from other militant outfits such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the near term, the decapitation of JI’s military and political wings, due to a series of arrests in recent years, means its resilience and adaptability will mainly depend on its social front. Multiple factors, such as the presence of rogue elements within JI capable of conducting attacks amidst the group’s present leadership vacuum, the policies of the next JI leader and the prospect of “black swan” events, will determine if JI will revive its aspirations for a military arm as mandated by its organisational guidelines.
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title Jemaah Islamiyah After the 2002 Bali Bombings: Two Decades of Continuity and Transformation
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