UNCERTAINTY IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: A BAYESIAN GAME ANALYSIS OF KOREA

• Published in: Global economic review 2002, 31(3), , pp.25-40
• Main Authors: 김희민, Jun Y. Choi
• Format: Article
• Language: Korean
• Subjects: 경제학
• ISSN: 1226-508X; 1744-3873

Bayesian games are used to analyze situations where at least one player is uncertain about the other’s preferences. For the past decade or so, the Bayesian models have been rigorously applied to various aspects of international relations involving uncertainty. These models have contributed to our understanding of international relations by uncovering complicated strategic interactions through deductive reasoning and by generating many empirically testable hypotheses. Apart from these efforts for general theory developments, however, scholars rarely applied Bayesian models to analyze real-world international events, although many of them involve situations where one or more players are uncertain about the other’s preferences. Some of these events are interesting and important in their own right, given their potential impact on regional security and the amount of attention paid by scholars and politicians alike. Therefore, these cases warrant independent studies utilizing Bayesian models. In this paper, we have developed two Bayesian models for the changing relationships North Korea has with South Korea and the United States. We also discuss another interesting aspect of North-South Korea-United States relations where North Korea is simultaneously playing similar, but separate, games with South Korea and the United States. KCI Citation Count: 0