The automatic termination clause in the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement—brinkmanship for future negotiation or a time bomb for self-destruction?

Abstract The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) is an important stride forward, but its future is uncertain because of the embedded automatic termination clause. There is a substantial possibility that this provision comes into effect. It would be prudent to focus on how best to utilize the FSA bef...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of international economic law 2024-10, Vol.27 (3), p.480-499
Main Author: Lee, Jaemin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Environmental protection
Fisheries subsidies
International law
Interpretation and construction
Law and legislation
Negotiation
Treaties
World Trade Organization
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Summary:Abstract The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) is an important stride forward, but its future is uncertain because of the embedded automatic termination clause. There is a substantial possibility that this provision comes into effect. It would be prudent to focus on how best to utilize the FSA before that scenario materializes. Most notably, international law jurisprudence and World Trade Organization precedents posit that panels can continue to review disputes and issue decisions even after the FSA is terminated as long as the disputes are brought to them before termination. The automatic termination clause is a unique, unprecedented feature, which may kill the hard-earned momentum of the fisheries subsidies regulation. If managed well, however, the potential damage can be controlled and the new agreement can be utilized for the ultimate success of global fisheries subsidies regulation.
ISSN:1369-3034
1464-3758
DOI:10.1093/jiel/jgae030