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THE SEMANTICS OF SUBSTANTIAL NAMES: THE TRADITION OF THE COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE'S "METAPHYSICS"

Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem,...

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Published in:Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 2008-01, Vol.75 (2), p.395-440
Main Author: Amerini, Fabrizio
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem, Aristotle states that the name «animal» can refer to both, not, however, in one and the same sense (i.e. in a univocal way) but rather by expressing two different senses which are nonetheless related to each other (viz. in an analogical way). Nevertheless, Aristotle does not say anything concerning which of these two senses the name «animal» primarily expresses. This text of the Metaphysics gives to the medieval Latin commentators the occasion to deal with the topic of the signification of substantial names and, more particularly, to assess Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle's semantics. In the paper I attempt to reconstruct some important patterns of argument elaborated by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators on the Metaphysics in their endeavor to solve the problem and to explain Averroes's interpretation.
ISSN:1370-7493
1783-1717
DOI:10.2143/RTPM.75.2.2033409