Loading…
Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model
Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The curr...
Saved in:
Published in: | PloS one 2012-06, Vol.7 (6), p.e39188-e39188 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863 |
---|---|
cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863 |
container_end_page | e39188 |
container_issue | 6 |
container_start_page | e39188 |
container_title | PloS one |
container_volume | 7 |
creator | Miranda, Luciano de Souza, Adauto J F Ferreira, Fernando F Campos, Paulo R A |
description | Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0039188 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_plos_</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_plos_journals_1325027002</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A477044773</galeid><doaj_id>oai_doaj_org_article_14722c8d384c4b55868cd21ec270efdd</doaj_id><sourcerecordid>A477044773</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkl1r2zAYhc3YWLts_2BshsHYLpLpw5blm0EJ-wgrFPZ1K2TpdaKgWK4kh-7fT2ncEo9eDINt5OccvTo-WfYSowWmFf6wdYPvpF30roMFQrTGnD_KznFNyZwRRB-fvJ9lz0LYIlRSztjT7IyQiuGKsvPs29Ltegs3efSyCyYa1-XR5cq5HryMZg95Axu5N87npstlHqIfVBw86Lx3_WDlrWTnNNjn2ZNW2gAvxucs-_X508_l1_nl1ZfV8uJyrlhN4rxkGEil0gh1LbUuWNmQmiOi6wZTYIq1spQU8wa3FAHXDUWUVwlnqFUtZ3SWvT769tYFMeYQBKakRKRCiCRidSS0k1vRe7OT_o9w0ojbBefXQvpolAWBi4oQxTXlhSqasuSMK00wpPkQtFonr4_jbkOzA62gS1HZien0S2c2Yu32glJOWIp8lr0bDby7HiBEsTNBgbWyAzekuREpMEKcH-Z-8w_68OlGai3TAUzXurSvOpiKi6KqUJFuNFGLB6h0adgZlUrTmrQ-EbyfCBIT4Sau5RCCWP34_v_s1e8p-_aE3YC0cROcHQ7FCVOwOILKuxA8tPchYyQOnb9LQxw6L8bOJ9mr0x90L7orOf0Lifz7TQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Open Website</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1325027002</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model</title><source>Publicly Available Content Database</source><source>PubMed</source><creator>Miranda, Luciano ; de Souza, Adauto J F ; Ferreira, Fernando F ; Campos, Paulo R A</creator><contributor>Szolnoki, Attila</contributor><creatorcontrib>Miranda, Luciano ; de Souza, Adauto J F ; Ferreira, Fernando F ; Campos, Paulo R A ; Szolnoki, Attila</creatorcontrib><description>Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039188</identifier><identifier>PMID: 22761736</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Public Library of Science</publisher><subject>Analysis ; Behavior ; Biological Evolution ; Biology ; Coexistence ; Computer Science ; Computer Simulation ; Cooperation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Emigration and Immigration ; Evolution ; Evolutionary biology ; Game Theory ; Humans ; Learning ; Mathematics ; Migration ; Models, Biological ; Mutation ; Physics ; Political asylum ; Population ; Population Dynamics ; Prisoner's dilemma ; Social and Behavioral Sciences ; Species extinction ; Studies ; Success</subject><ispartof>PloS one, 2012-06, Vol.7 (6), p.e39188-e39188</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2012 Public Library of Science</rights><rights>2012 Miranda et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>Miranda et al. 2012</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1325027002/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1325027002?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,727,780,784,885,25753,27924,27925,37012,37013,44590,53791,53793,75126</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22761736$$D View this record in MEDLINE/PubMed$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><contributor>Szolnoki, Attila</contributor><creatorcontrib>Miranda, Luciano</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>de Souza, Adauto J F</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ferreira, Fernando F</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Campos, Paulo R A</creatorcontrib><title>Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model</title><title>PloS one</title><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><description>Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.</description><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Biological Evolution</subject><subject>Biology</subject><subject>Coexistence</subject><subject>Computer Science</subject><subject>Computer Simulation</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Cooperative Behavior</subject><subject>Emigration and Immigration</subject><subject>Evolution</subject><subject>Evolutionary biology</subject><subject>Game Theory</subject><subject>Humans</subject><subject>Learning</subject><subject>Mathematics</subject><subject>Migration</subject><subject>Models, Biological</subject><subject>Mutation</subject><subject>Physics</subject><subject>Political asylum</subject><subject>Population</subject><subject>Population Dynamics</subject><subject>Prisoner's dilemma</subject><subject>Social and Behavioral Sciences</subject><subject>Species extinction</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Success</subject><issn>1932-6203</issn><issn>1932-6203</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2012</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>PIMPY</sourceid><sourceid>DOA</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkl1r2zAYhc3YWLts_2BshsHYLpLpw5blm0EJ-wgrFPZ1K2TpdaKgWK4kh-7fT2ncEo9eDINt5OccvTo-WfYSowWmFf6wdYPvpF30roMFQrTGnD_KznFNyZwRRB-fvJ9lz0LYIlRSztjT7IyQiuGKsvPs29Ltegs3efSyCyYa1-XR5cq5HryMZg95Axu5N87npstlHqIfVBw86Lx3_WDlrWTnNNjn2ZNW2gAvxucs-_X508_l1_nl1ZfV8uJyrlhN4rxkGEil0gh1LbUuWNmQmiOi6wZTYIq1spQU8wa3FAHXDUWUVwlnqFUtZ3SWvT769tYFMeYQBKakRKRCiCRidSS0k1vRe7OT_o9w0ojbBefXQvpolAWBi4oQxTXlhSqasuSMK00wpPkQtFonr4_jbkOzA62gS1HZien0S2c2Yu32glJOWIp8lr0bDby7HiBEsTNBgbWyAzekuREpMEKcH-Z-8w_68OlGai3TAUzXurSvOpiKi6KqUJFuNFGLB6h0adgZlUrTmrQ-EbyfCBIT4Sau5RCCWP34_v_s1e8p-_aE3YC0cROcHQ7FCVOwOILKuxA8tPchYyQOnb9LQxw6L8bOJ9mr0x90L7orOf0Lifz7TQ</recordid><startdate>20120625</startdate><enddate>20120625</enddate><creator>Miranda, Luciano</creator><creator>de Souza, Adauto J F</creator><creator>Ferreira, Fernando F</creator><creator>Campos, Paulo R A</creator><general>Public Library of Science</general><general>Public Library of Science (PLoS)</general><scope>CGR</scope><scope>CUY</scope><scope>CVF</scope><scope>ECM</scope><scope>EIF</scope><scope>NPM</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>IOV</scope><scope>ISR</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7QG</scope><scope>7QL</scope><scope>7QO</scope><scope>7RV</scope><scope>7SN</scope><scope>7SS</scope><scope>7T5</scope><scope>7TG</scope><scope>7TM</scope><scope>7U9</scope><scope>7X2</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8C1</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>8FH</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ARAPS</scope><scope>ATCPS</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BBNVY</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>BHPHI</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>D1I</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>H94</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>KB.</scope><scope>KB0</scope><scope>KL.</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>LK8</scope><scope>M0K</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M7N</scope><scope>M7P</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>NAPCQ</scope><scope>P5Z</scope><scope>P62</scope><scope>P64</scope><scope>PATMY</scope><scope>PDBOC</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>PYCSY</scope><scope>RC3</scope><scope>7X8</scope><scope>5PM</scope><scope>DOA</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20120625</creationdate><title>Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model</title><author>Miranda, Luciano ; de Souza, Adauto J F ; Ferreira, Fernando F ; Campos, Paulo R A</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2012</creationdate><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Behavior</topic><topic>Biological Evolution</topic><topic>Biology</topic><topic>Coexistence</topic><topic>Computer Science</topic><topic>Computer Simulation</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Cooperative Behavior</topic><topic>Emigration and Immigration</topic><topic>Evolution</topic><topic>Evolutionary biology</topic><topic>Game Theory</topic><topic>Humans</topic><topic>Learning</topic><topic>Mathematics</topic><topic>Migration</topic><topic>Models, Biological</topic><topic>Mutation</topic><topic>Physics</topic><topic>Political asylum</topic><topic>Population</topic><topic>Population Dynamics</topic><topic>Prisoner's dilemma</topic><topic>Social and Behavioral Sciences</topic><topic>Species extinction</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Success</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Miranda, Luciano</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>de Souza, Adauto J F</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ferreira, Fernando F</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Campos, Paulo R A</creatorcontrib><collection>Medline</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE (Ovid)</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>MEDLINE</collection><collection>PubMed</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale_Opposing Viewpoints In Context</collection><collection>Science (Gale in Context)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Animal Behavior Abstracts</collection><collection>Bacteriology Abstracts (Microbiology B)</collection><collection>Biotechnology Research Abstracts</collection><collection>Nursing & Allied Health Database</collection><collection>Ecology Abstracts</collection><collection>Entomology Abstracts (Full archive)</collection><collection>Immunology Abstracts</collection><collection>Meteorological & Geoastrophysical Abstracts</collection><collection>Nucleic Acids Abstracts</collection><collection>Virology and AIDS Abstracts</collection><collection>Agricultural Science Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest_Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>Public Health Database</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Natural Science Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Materials Science & Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>Agricultural & Environmental Science Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>Biological Science Collection</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Natural Science Collection</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Materials Science Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>AIDS and Cancer Research Abstracts</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>Materials Science Database</collection><collection>Nursing & Allied Health Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Meteorological & Geoastrophysical Abstracts - Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Biological Science Collection</collection><collection>Agriculture Science Database</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>PML(ProQuest Medical Library)</collection><collection>Algology Mycology and Protozoology Abstracts (Microbiology C)</collection><collection>ProQuest Biological Science Journals</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Nursing & Allied Health Premium</collection><collection>ProQuest advanced technologies & aerospace journals</collection><collection>ProQuest Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Collection</collection><collection>Biotechnology and BioEngineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Environmental Science Database</collection><collection>Materials science collection</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering collection</collection><collection>Environmental Science Collection</collection><collection>Genetics Abstracts</collection><collection>MEDLINE - Academic</collection><collection>PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)</collection><collection>Directory of Open Access Journals</collection><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Miranda, Luciano</au><au>de Souza, Adauto J F</au><au>Ferreira, Fernando F</au><au>Campos, Paulo R A</au><au>Szolnoki, Attila</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model</atitle><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><date>2012-06-25</date><risdate>2012</risdate><volume>7</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>e39188</spage><epage>e39188</epage><pages>e39188-e39188</pages><issn>1932-6203</issn><eissn>1932-6203</eissn><abstract>Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.</abstract><cop>United States</cop><pub>Public Library of Science</pub><pmid>22761736</pmid><doi>10.1371/journal.pone.0039188</doi><tpages>e39188</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 1932-6203 |
ispartof | PloS one, 2012-06, Vol.7 (6), p.e39188-e39188 |
issn | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_plos_journals_1325027002 |
source | Publicly Available Content Database; PubMed |
subjects | Analysis Behavior Biological Evolution Biology Coexistence Computer Science Computer Simulation Cooperation Cooperative Behavior Emigration and Immigration Evolution Evolutionary biology Game Theory Humans Learning Mathematics Migration Models, Biological Mutation Physics Political asylum Population Population Dynamics Prisoner's dilemma Social and Behavioral Sciences Species extinction Studies Success |
title | Complex transition to cooperative behavior in a structured population model |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-26T04%3A25%3A46IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_plos_&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Complex%20transition%20to%20cooperative%20behavior%20in%20a%20structured%20population%20model&rft.jtitle=PloS%20one&rft.au=Miranda,%20Luciano&rft.date=2012-06-25&rft.volume=7&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=e39188&rft.epage=e39188&rft.pages=e39188-e39188&rft.issn=1932-6203&rft.eissn=1932-6203&rft_id=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0039188&rft_dat=%3Cgale_plos_%3EA477044773%3C/gale_plos_%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c692t-561e27c27699add465b29802d9b13e6c6fa5a318b1f30e8db3038727660fcf863%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1325027002&rft_id=info:pmid/22761736&rft_galeid=A477044773&rfr_iscdi=true |