Dependency links can hinder the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on lattices and networks

Networks with dependency links are more vulnerable when facing the attacks. Recent research also has demonstrated that the interdependent groups support the spreading of cooperation. We study the prisoner's dilemma games on spatial networks with dependency links, in which a fraction of individu...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:PloS one 2015-03, Vol.10 (3), p.e0121508-e0121508
Main Authors: Wang, Xuwen, Nie, Sen, Wang, Binghong
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Behavioral evolution
Cooperation
Defections
Extortion
Games
Humans
Lattices
Links
Models, Theoretical
Networks
Physics
Prisoner Dilemma
Science
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Networks with dependency links are more vulnerable when facing the attacks. Recent research also has demonstrated that the interdependent groups support the spreading of cooperation. We study the prisoner's dilemma games on spatial networks with dependency links, in which a fraction of individual pairs is selected to depend on each other. The dependency individuals can gain an extra payoff whose value is between the payoff of mutual cooperation and the value of temptation to defect. Thus, this mechanism reflects that the dependency relation is stronger than the relation of ordinary mutual cooperation, but it is not large enough to cause the defection of the dependency pair. We show that the dependence of individuals hinders, promotes and never affects the cooperation on regular ring networks, square lattice, random and scale-free networks, respectively. The results for the square lattice and regular ring networks are demonstrated by the pair approximation.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0121508