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Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations

Most environments favor defection over cooperation due to natural selection. Nonetheless, the emergence of cooperation is omnipresent in many biological, social, and economic systems, quite contrary to the well-celebrated Darwinian theory of evolution. Much research has been devoted to better unders...

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Published in:PloS one 2022-08, Vol.17 (8), p.e0272719-e0272719
Main Authors: Roy, Sourav, Nag Chowdhury, Sayantan, Mali, Prakash Chandra, Perc, Matjaz, Ghosh, Dibakar
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description Most environments favor defection over cooperation due to natural selection. Nonetheless, the emergence of cooperation is omnipresent in many biological, social, and economic systems, quite contrary to the well-celebrated Darwinian theory of evolution. Much research has been devoted to better understanding how and why cooperation persists among self-interested individuals despite their competition for limited resources. Here we go beyond a single social dilemma since individuals usually encounter various social challenges. In particular, we propose and study a mathematical model incorporating both the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. We further extend this model by considering ecological signatures like mutation and selfless one-sided contribution of altruist free space. The nonlinear evolutionary dynamics that results from these upgrades offer a broader range of equilibrium outcomes, and it also often favors cooperation over defection. With the help of analytical and numerical calculations, our theoretical model sheds light on the mechanisms that maintain biodiversity, and it helps to explain the evolution of social order in human societies.
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subjects Analysis
Biodiversity
Biological evolution
Biology and Life Sciences
Birth rate
Cooperation
Decision making
Ecology and Environmental Sciences
Evaluation
Evolution
Evolutionary biology
Game theory
Genetic aspects
Mathematical models
Mutation
Natural selection
Nonlinear dynamics
Physical Sciences
Political asylum
Research and Analysis Methods
Snowdrifts
Social Sciences
title Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations
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