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Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice
Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With...
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Published in: | PloS one 2023-03, Vol.18 (3), p.e0282434-e0282434 |
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description | Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. Measures to effectively resolve medical malpractice are proposed by introducing a third-party normative system, establishing a doctor-patient information management system, and improving doctors' reward and punishment mechanisms. |
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The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. Measures to effectively resolve medical malpractice are proposed by introducing a third-party normative system, establishing a doctor-patient information management system, and improving doctors' reward and punishment mechanisms.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1932-6203</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282434</identifier><identifier>PMID: 36989284</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>United States: Public Library of Science</publisher><subject>Behavior ; Biology and Life Sciences ; Computer and Information Sciences ; Cooperation ; Data base management systems ; Evaluation ; Evolution ; Evolutionary theories ; Game Theory ; Games ; Health care expenditures ; Hospitals ; Humans ; Hypotheses ; Information management ; Malpractice ; Medical devices ; Medical malpractice ; Medical personnel ; Medicine ; Medicine and Health Sciences ; Patients ; People and Places ; Physical Sciences ; Physician-Patient Relations ; Physicians ; Players ; Professional malpractice ; Punishment ; Rationality ; Research and Analysis Methods ; Simulation methods ; Social exclusion ; Social Sciences ; Strategies ; Strategy</subject><ispartof>PloS one, 2023-03, Vol.18 (3), p.e0282434-e0282434</ispartof><rights>Copyright: © 2023 Song et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2023 Public Library of Science</rights><rights>2023 Song et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><rights>2023 Song et al 2023 Song et al</rights><rights>2023 Song et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 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The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. 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and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice</atitle><jtitle>PloS one</jtitle><addtitle>PLoS One</addtitle><date>2023-03-29</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>18</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>e0282434</spage><epage>e0282434</epage><pages>e0282434-e0282434</pages><issn>1932-6203</issn><eissn>1932-6203</eissn><abstract>Doctors and patients are the two critical players in medical malpractice. The evolutionary game model of doctors and patients is constructed based on information asymmetry and bounded rationality. The strategy selection problem of the two players in the medical malpractice process was studied. With change in different parameters, the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model was demonstrated using Vensim simulation. The results show that the weight, penalty amount, benefits of standardized practices, and patient medical alarm cost of strategies of different doctors are the key factors affecting doctor-patient evolutionary game system. Medical malpractice can be reduced by adjusting the weight of different strategy choices, increasing the penalties for illegal practices, and standardizing medical malpractice costs based on doctors' standardized practice income. 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subjects | Behavior Biology and Life Sciences Computer and Information Sciences Cooperation Data base management systems Evaluation Evolution Evolutionary theories Game Theory Games Health care expenditures Hospitals Humans Hypotheses Information management Malpractice Medical devices Medical malpractice Medical personnel Medicine Medicine and Health Sciences Patients People and Places Physical Sciences Physician-Patient Relations Physicians Players Professional malpractice Punishment Rationality Research and Analysis Methods Simulation methods Social exclusion Social Sciences Strategies Strategy |
title | Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice |
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