Evolution as a result of resource flow in ecosystems: Ecological dynamics can drive evolution

To see how the flow of energy across ecosystems can derive evolution, I introduce a framework in which individuals interact with their peers and environment to accumulate resources, and use the resources to pay for their metabolic costs, grow and reproduce. I show that two conservation principles de...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:PloS one 2023-10, Vol.18 (10), p.e0286922-e0286922
Main Author: Salahshour, Mohammad
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavior evolution
Biology and Life Sciences
Computer and Information Sciences
Conservation
Cooperation
Ecological effects
Ecology and Environmental Sciences
Ecosystems
Energy consumption
Equality
Evolution
Fluctuations
Game theory
Life history
Life span
Market equilibrium
Metabolism
Mutation
Physical Sciences
Political asylum
Population structure
Principles
Resource conservation
Viscosity
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:To see how the flow of energy across ecosystems can derive evolution, I introduce a framework in which individuals interact with their peers and environment to accumulate resources, and use the resources to pay for their metabolic costs, grow and reproduce. I show that two conservation principles determine the system’s equilibrium state: conservation of resources- a physical principle stating that in the equilibrium, resource production and consumption should balance, and payoff equality- an economic principle, stating that the payoffs of different types in equilibrium should equal. Besides the equilibrium state, the system shows non-equilibrium fluctuations derived by the exponential growth of the individuals in which the payoff equality principle does not hold. A simple gradient-ascend dynamical mean-field equation predicts the onset of non-equilibrium fluctuations. As an example, I study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games. In both mixed and structured populations, cooperation evolves naturally in resource-poor environments but not in resource-rich environments. Population viscosity facilitates cooperation in poor environments but can be detrimental to cooperation in rich environments. In addition, cooperators and defectors show different life-history strategies: Cooperators live shorter lives and reproduce more than defectors. Both population structure and, more significantly, population viscosity reduce lifespan and life history differences between cooperators and defectors.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0286922