A Stackelberg-based repurchase strategy for rail freight options (BRFO)

This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonpa...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:PloS one 2024-09, Vol.19 (9), p.e0307215
Main Authors: Shen, Qi, Kuang, Tingyue, Guo, Jingwei
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bank technology
Competitiveness
Costs
Customers
Decision making
Emissions
Energy consumption
Equilibrium
Flexibility
Freight
Game Theory
Greenhouse gases
Humans
Leadership
Management
Models, Economic
Parameter estimation
Parameter identification
Parameter uncertainty
Power
Pricing
Railroads
Revenue sharing
Stochastic methods
Stochasticity
Strategic management
Transaction processing
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Summary:This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonparametric Ito stochastic method, the research addresses key challenges of information asymmetry and market uncertainty. The proposed methodology emphasizes dynamic pricing strategies and market adaptation, constructing a Nash equilibrium framework within railway freight pricing. The findings suggest significant strategic benefits for railway enterprises, positioning BRFO as a crucial tool for improving competitiveness in the face of alternative transport options.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0307215