Models and the locus of their truth

If models can be true, where is their truth located? Giere (Explaining science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988) has suggested an account of theoretical models on which models themselves are not truth-valued. The paper suggests modifying Giere's account without going all the way to p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2011-05, Vol.180 (1), p.47-63
Main Author: Mäki, Uskali
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Abstract objects
Economic modeling
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Education
Epistemology
Humanities
Idealization
Land use
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Plains
Pragmatics
Realism
Simulation
Statistical relevance model
Towns
Truth
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Summary:If models can be true, where is their truth located? Giere (Explaining science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988) has suggested an account of theoretical models on which models themselves are not truth-valued. The paper suggests modifying Giere's account without going all the way to purely pragmatic conceptions of truth—while giving pragmatics a prominent role in modeling and truth-acquisition. The strategy of the paper is to ask: if I want to relocate truth inside models, how do I get it, what else do I need to accept and reject? In particular, what ideas about model and truth do I need? The case used as an illustration is the world's first economic model, that of von Thiinen (1826/1842) on agricultural land use in the highly idealized Isolated State.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-009-9566-0