Team Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence From the Round Rock Pilot Project on Team Incentives

Education policymakers have shown increased interest in incentive programs for teachers based on the outcomes of their students. This article examines a program in which bonuses were awarded to teams of middle school teachers based on their collective contribution to student test score gains. The st...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Educational evaluation and policy analysis 2012-12, Vol.34 (4), p.367-390
Main Authors: Springer, Matthew G., Pane, John F., Le, Vi-Nhuan, McCaffrey, Daniel F., Burns, Susan Freeman, Hamilton, Laura S., Stecher, Brian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Academic Achievement
Achievement Gains
Control groups
Education policy
Educational evaluation
Educational Experiments
Educational incentives
Evidence
Grade 6
Grade 7
Grade 8
Incentives
Interdisciplinary Approach
Mathematics education
Mathematics teachers
Merit Pay
Middle school students
Middle School Teachers
Pay for performance
Pilot Projects
Professional standards
Program Effectiveness
Rewards
Scores
Standardized tests
Student attitudes
Teacher Attitudes
Teacher Evaluation
Teacher surveys
Teachers
Teamwork
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Summary:Education policymakers have shown increased interest in incentive programs for teachers based on the outcomes of their students. This article examines a program in which bonuses were awarded to teams of middle school teachers based on their collective contribution to student test score gains. The study employs a randomized controlled trial to examine effects of the bonus program over the course of an academic year, with the experiment repeated a second year, and finds no significant effects on the achievement of students or the attitudes and practices of teachers. The lack of effects of team-level pay for performance in this study is consistent with other recent experiments studying the short-term effects of bonus awards for individual performance or whole-school performance.
ISSN:0162-3737
1935-1062
DOI:10.3102/0162373712439094