On economic games which are not necessarily superadditive: Solution concepts and application to a local public good problem with few a agents

Core-like solution concepts based on stable coalition structures are studied in the context of games which are not necessarily superadditive. It is shown that a simple economic model involving local public goods financed by wealth taxes has this characteristic.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 1979, Vol.3 (4), p.301-306
Main Authors: Guesnerie, R., Oddou, C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Core-like solution concepts based on stable coalition structures are studied in the context of games which are not necessarily superadditive. It is shown that a simple economic model involving local public goods financed by wealth taxes has this characteristic.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/0165-1765(79)90001-6