A Confutation of Convergent Realism

This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the n...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 1981-03, Vol.48 (1), p.19-49
Main Author: Laudan, Larry
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Atomic theory
Empiricism
Epistemology
Mathematical realism
Ontological pluralism
Philosophical realism
Phlogiston theory
Quantum mechanics
Truth
Verisimilitude
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Summary:This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific realism.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/288975