RETAINING THE RULE OF LAW IN A "CHEVRON" WORLD

In recent years, scholars have applied organization theory to show how administrative agencies may not be as independent of Congress as was traditionally feared in administrative law. Professor Fitts views the Strauss article as showing persuasively how traditional policy concerns about legislative...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Chicago-Kent law review 1990-01, Vol.66 (2), p.355
Main Author: Fitts, Michael A
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:In recent years, scholars have applied organization theory to show how administrative agencies may not be as independent of Congress as was traditionally feared in administrative law. Professor Fitts views the Strauss article as showing persuasively how traditional policy concerns about legislative delegation remain despite these insights, and that the historical reliance on legislative history in statutory construction can help alleviate some of these difficulties. While agreeing with the Strauss thesis, Fitts suggests there remain grounds for treating legislative history with some care and skepticism.
ISSN:0009-3599