Operationism Still Isn't Real: A Temporary Reply To Kendler

Kendler's defense of operationism is briefly rebutted, pending a fuller reply. After a few minor disagreements are dispensed with, problems with Kendler's account are raised. It is argued that Kendler's own examples of operational definition either demonstrate that when useful, they a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of mind and behavior 1981-10, Vol.2 (3), p.343-348
Main Author: Leahey, Thomas H.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Empiricism
Hope
Intelligence
Operational definition
Operationalism
Perception theory
Philosophical psychology
Positivism
Psychological research
Psychology
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Summary:Kendler's defense of operationism is briefly rebutted, pending a fuller reply. After a few minor disagreements are dispensed with, problems with Kendler's account are raised. It is argued that Kendler's own examples of operational definition either demonstrate that when useful, they aren't operational, or when operational, they aren't useful. Nor does my critique depend on Kuhnian repudiation of "immaculate perception." Most importantly, however, Kendler's attempt to detach operationism from its philosophical context merely smuggles that context into psychology unexamined.
ISSN:0271-0137