Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information

We analyse the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 1993-06, Vol.3 (2), p.195-216
Main Authors: Koutsougeras, Leonidas C., Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic agents
Economic analysis
Economic theory
Endowments
Information economy
Information intermediaries
Trade
Trade intermediaries
Urban economics
Utility functions
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Summary:We analyse the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of these core notions is provided.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/BF01212914