Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation

A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for a class of evolutionary dynamics. However, not all stationary points of these dynamics are Nash equilibria. An "evolutionary equilibrium" is the limit of stationary points of an evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 1994-07, Vol.7 (1), p.10-34
Main Author: Boylan, Richard T.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point for a class of evolutionary dynamics. However, not all stationary points of these dynamics are Nash equilibria. An "evolutionary equilibrium" is the limit of stationary points of an evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. The set of these evolutionary equilibria is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and the set of ESS. Journal of Economic Literature Numbers: C72, C73.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1006/game.1994.1033