Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria

Simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game. In a preplay stage, players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals' first period actions. In one extended game, players first decide when to select ac...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 1990-03, Vol.2 (1), p.29-46
Main Authors: Hamilton, Jonathan H, Slutsky, Steven M
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game. In a preplay stage, players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals' first period actions. In one extended game, players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game. The equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame Pareto dominate those payoffs. In another extended game, deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action. Both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-J