II—Meaning, Justification, and‘Primitive Normativity’

I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society 2012-06, Vol.86 (1), p.147-174
Main Author: Haddock, Adrian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Philosophy
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Summary:I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’.
ISSN:0309-7013
1467-8349
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00212.x