II—Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society 2013-06, Vol.87 (1), p.89-113
Main Author: Paul, L.A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
ISSN:0309-7013
1467-8349
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00221.x