Propositional unity: what's the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell's influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical studies 2013-08, Vol.165 (1), p.71-93
Main Author: King, Jeffrey C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ascriptions
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Instantiation
Mathematics
Metaphysics
Mind and body. Personal identity
Modal realism
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Predicates
Predication
Property rights
Propositions
Semantics
Swimming
Syntactics
Truth condition
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Summary:At least since Russell's influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-012-9920-9