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On the interval Shapley value

The Shapley value is one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of cooperative game theory. It was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. In this article, we focus on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of playe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Optimization 2014-05, Vol.63 (5), p.747-755
Main Author: Gok, SZAlparslan
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:The Shapley value is one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of cooperative game theory. It was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. In this article, we focus on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. Our main contribution is to characterize the interval Shapley value by using the properties of efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. We also give a characterization by using the interval dividends.
ISSN:0233-1934
1029-4945
DOI:10.1080/02331934.2012.686999